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We construct, on the basis of an original 
methodology and database, composite indices to 
measure domestic ﬁ  nancial development in 26 
emerging economies, using mature economies 
as a benchmark. Twenty-two variables are 
used and grouped according to three broad 
dimensions: (i) institutions and regulations; (ii) 
size of and access to ﬁ  nancial markets and (iii) 
market performance. This new evidence aims to 
ﬁ  ll a gap in the economic literature, which has 
not thus far developed comparable time series 
including both emerging and mature economies. 
In doing so, we provide a quantitative measure 
of the – usually considerable – scope for the 
selected emerging countries and regions to 
“catch up” in ﬁ  nancial terms. Moreover, we ﬁ  nd 
evidence that a process of ﬁ  nancial convergence 
towards mature economies has already started in 
certain emerging economies. Finally, we conduct 
an econometric analysis showing that different 
levels of domestic ﬁ  nancial development tend 
to be associated with the building up of external 
imbalances across countries.
Keywords:  Financial development, index 
construction, commodity and oil-exporting 
countries, G20, major emerging economies, 
ﬁ  nancial catching up, global imbalances. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Where do emerging market economies (EMEs,    •
hereinafter also referred to as emerging 
economies or emerging countries) stand in 
terms of domestic  ﬁ  nancial  development 
compared with mature economies? Did we 
observe any ﬁ  nancial catching-up of emerging 
countries towards mature economies in the 
recent past? Does econometric analysis 
support the idea that EMEs’ ﬁ  nancial 
underdevelopment has been one structural 
factor contributing to the accumulation of 
global external imbalances and, in particular, 
to the phenomenon of net capital ﬂ  owing 
“uphill” from the South (certain emerging 
economies) to the North (certain mature 
economies) in recent years? And, if the reply 
to these questions is positive, what could the 
policy-relevant implications be?
This paper addresses these questions by    •
assessing the degree of domestic ﬁ  nancial 
development (DFD) in emerging market 
economies, both in comparison with 
benchmark mature economies and over 
time. To this aim, a number of quantitative 
measures and indices, as well as a ﬁ  nal 
composite index, are developed on the 
basis of an original methodology and large 
database. After conducting robustness checks, 
this evidence is then used for an econometric 
analysis of the link between DFD and 
macroeconomic variables such as savings, 
investment and current account balances. 
Our DFD indices are constructed in line    •
with such objectives. In particular, our 
deﬁ  nition of DFD is based on the notion of 
complete domestic ﬁ  nancial markets, i.e. the 
capability of one country to channel savings 
into investment efﬁ   ciently and effectively 
within its own borders. This capability can 
be assessed by focusing on three broad 
dimensions of DFD, which we measure both 
separately and jointly: (1) the institutions 
and rules supporting DFD; (2) the relative 
size and diversiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial markets 
in each economy, as well as the possibility 
for economic agents to access such markets 
efﬁ   ciently; and (3) the “performance” of 
each  ﬁ   nancial system in terms of market 
liquidity, banking efﬁ  ciency, and the degree 
of “crowding in” of the private sector in 
comparison with the relative weight of the 
government and the central bank. Given this 
deﬁ  nition of DFD, it should be emphasised 
that our paper treats ﬁ  nancial openness as a 
separate dimension in the analysis, i.e. not as 
a component of DFD. Moreover, our index 
intentionally does not address ﬁ  nancial 
stability issues. In this way we take account 
of the trade-off between ﬁ  nancial risks and 
ﬁ  nancial innovation/return by only focusing 
on the latter aspect. This allows us not to 
rank high those EMEs that achieve ﬁ  nancial 
stability over the short run by means of 
ﬁ  nancial repression and, on the other hand, 
to completely disregard ﬁ  nancial  stability 
issues which, as the ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis 
conﬁ  rms, are extremely complex.
Turning to the    • main ﬁ  ndings of the paper, 
Table 3 on pp. 28-29 and, in greater detail, 
Table 4 on p. 41 rank our selected 26 EMEs 
in terms of degree of DFD and compare 
them with six benchmark mature economies 
belonging to the Group of Seven (all 
G7 members except Canada, with Germany, 
France and Italy grouped together in a 
weighted aggregate called “euro area-G3”). 
Owing to data availability at the time this 
paper was prepared, the year chosen is 2006 – 
a period which is particularly indicative of 
the degree of DFD across the globe prior to 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis underway since summer 
2007. We measure DFD on the basis of a 
composite normalised index. Tables 3 and 4 
show that:
except for the three Asian ﬁ  nancial centres    –
(Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and Taiwan 
PoC) and South Korea, EMEs still need 
to make substantial progress in order to 
achieve a degree of DFD similar to the 
G7 benchmark economies, although the 
scope for “catching up” varies signiﬁ  cantly 
from country to country;7
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SUMMARY there is some variance between the three    –
abovementioned broad dimensions of DFD 
that we have identiﬁ   ed. This may either 
be a genuine feature of such economies or 
attributable to limitations in our database 
and/or methodology. For instance, an 
unexpected ﬁ  nding is that China ranks third 
on the performance side but only 21st as 
regards the institutional dimension and 16th 
for size and access measures. The high rank 
in performance, however, does not reﬂ  ect 
market factors but rather factors such as a 
ﬁ  rst-class “cost/income” ratio for the Chinese 
banking system, not only owing to low 
labour costs but also, more importantly, to 
the setting by the central bank of benchmark 
interest rates on loans and deposits, which 
artiﬁ  cially ensure high net interest income. 
This example suggests that interpretation of 
the quantitative rankings in Tables 3 and 4 
should always be complemented with more 
qualitative analyses;
in our analysis we also split the three    –
dimensions of our index into eight more 
speciﬁ  c sub-dimensions of DFD, for which 
we also present and discuss country rankings. 
One interesting ﬁ  nding is that some ﬁ  nancial 
systems, such as in Chile and Israel, have 
relatively strong institutions and regulations 
but this is not fully reﬂ  ected in their size or 
performance scores. The question, therefore, 
arises why the successful institutional and 
regulatory environments of certain EMEs 
have not yet translated into good-sized and 
high-performing  ﬁ  nancial  intermediaries 
and markets;
besides focusing on individual countries, we    –
also describe the geographical distribution 
of the scores in our composite DFD index 
across different EME groupings, such as 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), 
the commodity exporters, emerging Asia or 
Latin America.
Moreover, we attempt to assess    • longer-
term trends in DFD, although hampered by 
serious data limitations. Our evidence, whilst 
far from conclusive, points to an accelerating 
pace of ﬁ   nancial development in several 
EMEs and suggests that some of them may 
even have started a process of ﬁ  nancial 
catching-up towards mature economies. 
We also show that past ﬁ  nancial  crises 
signiﬁ   cantly affected the relative degree 
of DFD across countries, thus raising the 
question of how global DFD conﬁ  gurations 
will change in the wake of the ongoing 
ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Last but not least, we discuss the hypothesis    •
that divergences in the degree of ﬁ  nancial 
development between emerging and mature 
economies have been one of the (many) 
factors associated, during the past decade, 
with capital moving ‘uphill from the South 
to the North of the world’, i.e. with current 
account imbalances between certain 
emerging and certain mature economies. 
We review the related literature and ﬁ  nd 
that this hypothesis is corroborated by an 
econometric analysis that we conduct using 
our DFD index. Among other things, we ﬁ  nd 
that a relative increase in ﬁ  nancial  sector 
development is associated with a reduction 
of current account balances, an increase in 
gross capital formation and a decrease in 
private savings. 
We conclude our paper by suggesting a    •
number of open issues for a more policy-
oriented discussion that our analysis could 
inspire. Also, we identify avenues for further 
research related to the link between DFD 
and savings, investment and current account 
balances. To this end, we intend to update 
our database and indices regularly. 8
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1  MOTIVATION: WHAT IS THE CASE FOR 
ANALYSING DOMESTIC FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING COUNTRIES?
Most emerging market economies (EMEs) 
have been experiencing staggering economic 
growth rates, especially over the past decade. 
The academic literature has sought to obtain 
a better understanding of the main drivers of 
rapid economic development in the beneﬁ  ting 
countries, or the lack thereof in those 
developing countries with either negligible 
or even negative rates of growth. The factors 
supposedly contributing to growth are manifold, 
and the empirical ﬁ  ndings seem to support the 
most diverse answers to this question. A paper 
by Xavier Sala-i-Martin on the determinants 
of economic development, with the suggestive 
title “I just ran two million regressions”, sheds 
some light on this vast ﬁ  eld of research. More 
recent work, which we summarise in Section 2 
and Boxes 1 and 2, emphasises the role that 
domestic ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions play 
as one key driver of economic development and, 
more generally, in relation to a range of other 
macroeconomic variables including savings, 
investment and current account balances.
Yet the link between ﬁ  nancial  development 
and such macro variables remains only 
partially understood. Among other things, 
EMEs’  ﬁ   nancial market development is 
often inadequately deﬁ   ned and, even more 
frequently, poorly measured. This paper 
contributes to ﬁ  lling these gaps by suggesting a 
comprehensive deﬁ  nition of domestic ﬁ  nancial 
development (DFD), quantifying this deﬁ  nition 
with measurable variables and aggregating them 
so as to develop an inclusive measure of this 
phenomenon, i.e. a composite index of DFD. 
A few stylised facts point to an accelerating 
pace of ﬁ   nancial development since the late 
1990s in most EMEs, suggesting that some 
of them may even have started a process 
of  ﬁ   nancial “catching up” towards mature 
economies:
First   • , the ratio to EMEs’ gross domestic 
product (GDP) of their total external 
and domestic funding – deﬁ  ned  as 
stock outstanding of private bank 
loans and debt-equity securities – 
is estimated to have increased from less than 
140% to above 180% from 1998 to 2006 
(Chart 1). The improved access to funding 
sources for local institutional sectors 
(government, corporate, household and 
ﬁ  nancial sectors) is likely to have contributed 
to higher domestic demand in EMEs.
Second   • , EMEs have been reducing their 
issuance of external debt since 2003, relying 
more on domestic debt – a process that 
has contributed to lower vulnerability to 
external shocks. Sovereign issuers and, to a 
lesser extent, banks, have been driving this 
development (Chart 2). 
Third   • , whilst of course starting from much 
lower levels, in the past decade the funding 
of EMEs in domestic markets has been 
increasing at a much faster pace than in 
G3 economies (deﬁ   ned as United States, 
EU14 and Japan), i.e. by 84% against 20% 
Chart 1 Total external and domestic funding 
sources of EMEs
(in percentage of GDP)
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Sources: BIS and Datastream.
Notes: The 17 EMEs portrayed in the three ﬁ  gures above are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan PoC, Thailand, Turkey and 
Venezuela. The EU14 aggregate is formed by Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (i.e., 
EU15 minus Luxembourg). 9
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between 1998 and 2007. As a result, in 2007 
the funding of EMEs in domestic markets 
accounted for 115% of their GDP (about 
half the G3 ratio), compared with 62% in 
1998 (which was less than one third of the 
G3 ratio) (Chart 3).
These stylised facts raise a number of questions 
with regard to possible implications. 
From a ﬁ  nancial  stability viewpoint, deeper, 
more liquid and better functioning markets 
in EMEs are likely to attract private foreign 
investors, as longer-run developments in 
EMEs’ gross and net capital inﬂ  ows conﬁ  rm. 
This has implications not only in terms of 
efﬁ   ciency but also ﬁ   nancial stability, since 
greater cross-border ﬁ  nancial exposures involve 
greater scope for heightened domestic market 
volatility in the presence of any ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, as experience fully corroborates. 
Whilst not overlooking the importance of this 
perspective, this paper nevertheless takes a 
different, macroeconomic approach. 
From a macroeconomic angle, a particularly 
interesting issue relates to the link between 
ﬁ   nancial development, international capital 
ﬂ   ows and global imbalances. Differences 
in the degree of DFD across countries 
may indeed, according to one strand in the 
literature, be a structural factor which has 
been contributing to the accumulation of 
global internal and external imbalances, in 
the same way as the possible catching up of 
ﬁ   nancially underdeveloped countries might 
in the longer run contribute to an unwinding 
of such imbalances. The core argument is that 
a high degree of ﬁ  nancial development tends 
to relax borrowing constraints in a country, 
thereby supporting its domestic demand; in 
Box 1 we provide a detailed account of this 
argument by referring to the recent academic 
and policy debate.
Chart 2 External versus domestic debt 
of EMEs
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Venezuela. The EU14 aggregate is formed by Austria, Belgium, 
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(i.e., EU15 minus Luxembourg).
Chart 3 Domestic market funding in EMEs 
and G3 economies
(in percentage of GDP)
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(i.e., EU15 minus Luxembourg).10
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Box 1
EMES’ FINANCIAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES
According to conventional models, ﬁ  nancial integration between two economies with different 
levels of economic development – the North and the South, where South refers to the group 
of emerging economies – should lead to capital ﬂ  ows from the North, where the rate of return 
on capital and the expected growth are lower, to the South. This can be named as the “ﬁ  rst 
order” effect. We know, however, that recent experience has partly contradicted the results of the 
standard model since, unlike private capital, total net capital has ﬂ  own from the South – taken, 
of course, as a whole since there are many well-known exceptions – to the North (the “Lucas 
paradox”). 
Bini Smaghi (2007) argues that a more important role than the ﬁ  rst order effects may have been 
played by “second order” effects originating in the South, the absence of risk sharing mechanisms 
owing to ﬁ  nancial market incompleteness and higher intrinsic risk aversion. Indeed, in the South 
trade development has preceded ﬁ  nancial development. A complete ﬁ  nancial system is not 
created overnight, and it is not surprising that, while over time several industries have migrated 
from the North to the South attracted by cheaper labour costs and other comparative advantages, 
the ﬁ  nancial industry has not been subject to the same type of migration. As a result, the North is 
likely to continue to enjoy a comparative advantage in the provision of ﬁ  nancial services for some 
time longer. If economic agents in the South face tighter domestic “borrowing constraints”1 than 
in the North, globalisation can lead to a net outﬂ  ow of capital from the South to the North. The 
asymmetry in borrowing constraints can help explain a current account constellation in which 
the South has a savings surplus and the North a deﬁ  cit. With globalisation, net lenders in the 
South gain access to the global assets of the North, but only specialised investors and lenders in 
the North gain equal access to net private borrowers in the South, because the latter’s liabilities 
are more local in nature, thus engendering a problem of asymmetric information.
Caballero (2006) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2007 and 2008) claim that the world has 
a shortage of supply of ﬁ  nancial assets to which fast-growing EMEs have allegedly contributed 
by seeking to store value in ﬁ  nancial assets that they do not produce. Unlike the situation in the 
past, these economies are now experiencing a large increase in their disposable income, but have 
not been able to sell in advance rights over their output, i.e. to create ﬁ  nancial assets, owing to 
their ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment. In this context, the fact that Anglo-Saxon economies have 
been supplying ﬁ  nancial assets to those EMEs which are unable to produce them would help 
partly explain external imbalances, as well as the global increase in the value of ﬁ  nancial assets – 
i.e. the decline in real long-term interest rates, or “interest rate conundrum” – that occurred until 
the correction triggered by the ﬁ  nancial crisis started in summer 2007. In the same vein, the 
scarce supply of sound and liquid ﬁ  nancial assets helps to explain the sub-prime crisis and the 
volatile oil and asset prices that followed it. 
1  The term “borrowing constraints” should be understood as a catchword referring to a broad and complex set of ﬁ  nancial market 
features that are captured by the index of DFD presented in this paper. For instance: (i) low domestic ﬁ  nancial market liquidity results 
in high domestic asset price volatility, thus creating incentives to invest abroad rather than domestically; (ii) information asymmetries 
(owing, e.g. to lenders’ insufﬁ  cient knowledge of borrowers) reduce the investment opportunities that can be ﬁ  nanced in a proﬁ  table 
way, thus forcing extra savings to be channelled abroad and (iii) limits to consumer credit also contribute to contain domestic demand 
by limiting consumer spending. 11
ECB
Occasional Paper No 102
April 2009
I   INTRODUCTION
1.2  OBJECTIVES: WHAT QUESTIONS DOES THIS 
PAPER ADDRESS?
On the basis of the motivations and background 
outlined above, the paper addresses issues 
related to domestic ﬁ   nancial development in 
EMEs by ﬁ  rst responding to two questions: 
(1)  Where do EMEs stand in terms of 
domestic  ﬁ   nancial development compared 
with benchmark mature economies? 
(2)  Did we observe any ﬁ  nancial  catching-up 
of emerging countries towards benchmark 
economies in the recent past? 
In contrast to the above authors, who focus on a country’s ability to supply assets, Mendoza, 
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) highlight the link between ﬁ   nancial underdevelopment and 
savings, hence the demand for ﬁ  nancial assets. Financial development, measured by the extent 
to which ﬁ  nancial contracts are enforceable, varies sharply across countries, thus contributing 
to a secular reduction in US savings (via consumption smoothing) and an increase in emerging 
countries’ demand for US assets.
Kroszner (2007) wonders why the bulk of EMEs were in the past recording current account 
deﬁ  cits, despite even less developed local ﬁ  nancial systems. Dorrucci and Brutti (2007) argue 
that this can only be understood in conjunction with a number of shocks on EMEs’ output growth 
and total savings: (i) the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, which resulted in a negative demand shock 
followed by the promotion of export-led growth and (ii) two positive supply shocks in the 2000s – 
a productivity shock and rising commodity prices – to which EMEs’ domestic demand has not 
reacted proportionally. The extra precautionary savings engendered by such shocks on EMEs’ 
income have tended to be channelled abroad owing to the EMEs’ ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment, 
thus resulting in current account surpluses. 
Differences in the degree of ﬁ  nancial development can also explain portfolio composition, 
i.e. why private capital tends to ﬂ  ow to the South and ofﬁ  cial capital is directed to the North. 
Mendoza et al. (2007) maintain that the United States is able to invest in foreign risky assets 
(then ﬁ  nancing this investment with debt) because the ability of an investing country to receive 
incomes generated abroad depends on the institutional, legal and contractual environment of this 
country regardless of the geographical location of the contracts owned. This view, however, is 
at odds with most of the literature, according to which it is the level of ﬁ  nancial development 
in the countries where assets originate that makes the difference, and not in the countries where 
investors reside. Eurosystem (2006) argues that, whatever the origin of EMEs’ excess savings, 
they still tend to be channelled abroad by the ofﬁ  cial sector (central banks or sovereign wealth 
funds) for three main reasons related to ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment: (i) the central banks’ attempt 
to “socialise”, by means of foreign exchange intervention, the exchange rate risk produced by 
currency mismatches in the national balance sheets of certain EMEs (e.g. sizeable liquid assets 
in foreign currency not hedged on the liability side); (ii) the inefﬁ  ciency of the private sector of 
most EMEs in channelling savings abroad and (iii) the presence, in countries such as China, of 
asymmetric capital controls discouraging portfolio capital outﬂ  ows.
Regarding, ﬁ  nally, regional peculiarities, Abiad, Leigh and Mody (2008) focus on the case of 
European emerging economies, providing a counterexample supporting a more conventional 
textbook perspective. Ohanian and Wright  (2007) observe that low return regions, such 
as Latin America, have over time received more capital than high return regions such as the 
“Asian Tigers”. This ﬁ  nding would restate the Lucas puzzle “Why doesn’t capital ﬂ  ow to poor 
countries?” to “Why doesn’t capital ﬂ  ow to high return countries?”. 12
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We answer these questions on the basis of a 
number of indicators and indices, as well as a 
ﬁ  nal composite index which we developed on 
the basis of an original methodology and large 
database. While in the ﬁ  nal stages of this project, 
the World Economic Forum (WEF) published 
an index of DFD in September 2008 which, 
like ours, comprises emerging and mature 
economies. Unlike the WEF index, however, this 
paper attempts – although restricted by serious 
data limitations – to go beyond the stock-taking 
of latest data, reconstructing time series which 
often date back to 1985. It is the ﬁ  rst time that a 
comprehensive index of ﬁ  nancial development, 
based on 22 variables classiﬁ  ed in a rigorous 
taxonomy, has been developed with the main 
focus on EMEs. In the previous literature, either 
composite indices were developed for mature 
economies only or time series analysis was 
conducted on the basis of individual variables 
used as a proxy for ﬁ  nancial development in 
EMEs.
In addition, the ﬁ  ndings presented in this paper 
allow two further questions to be addressed: 
(3) Does econometric analysis support the idea 
that EMEs’ ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment has 
been one structural factor contributing to the 
accumulation of global imbalances and, in 
particular, to the phenomenon of net capital 
ﬂ   owing “uphill” from the South (certain 
emerging economies) to the North (certain 
mature economies) in recent years? 
(4) If the reply to questions (1) to (3) is positive, 
what could the policy-relevant implications 
be?
In line with these questions and the literature 
discussed in Box 1, we are interested in 
capturing the “predisposition” of an emerging 
country to produce net capital outﬂ  ows 
(inﬂ   ows) because of its domestic ﬁ  nancial 
underdevelopment (high degree of ﬁ  nancial 
development). By doing so, we contribute to 
the literature on linkages between DFD, global 
saving-investment imbalances and capital ﬂ  ows 
between mature and emerging economies. While 
not being the core objective of this paper, our 
ﬁ  ndings encourage further research on the role 
played by the asymmetric nature of ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation in the emergence of widening 
current account positions between ﬁ  nancially 
mature and underdeveloped economies.
The paper consists of two parts. 
In the ﬁ  rst part, Sections 2 to 4, we brieﬂ  y review 
the literature and our methodological approach 
and database. The length of Section 3 on 
methodological issues and the related Annex A 
is justiﬁ  ed, in our view, by the need to be as 
precise and transparent as possible on the line of 
reasoning backing our approach. The database 
and its main features are discussed in Section 4, 
and compared with the main other datasets 
available in this area of research. 
The second part of the paper – Sections 5 to 7, 
to which those readers who are not interested 
in the methodological aspects can go directly – 
presents the ﬁ  ndings. Section 5 focuses on the 
three dimensions constituting our index of DFD, 
while Section 6 sums up the main results. In 
Section 7 we present an econometric analysis 
consistent with the interpretation that divergences 
in the degree of ﬁ  nancial development between 
emerging and mature economies have been 
associated with capital moving from emerging 
to mature economies during the past decade. 
Section 8 concludes by (i) suggesting a number 
of possible policy implications that could be 
drawn from our analysis and (ii) identifying 
avenues for further research.13
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Regarding the conceptual background to 
which this paper refers, we recommend an 
article in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin (2005) 
and the ECB’s report on ﬁ  nancial integration 
(2008), as well as Hartmann et al. (2007). Whilst 
these publications focus on mature economies, 
they also provide generally valid deﬁ  nitions 
of “ﬁ  nancial system”, “ﬁ  nancial development” 
and “ﬁ  nancial efﬁ  ciency”, as well as of their 
interrelation with “ﬁ   nancial integration” and 
“ﬁ   nancial stability”: deﬁ   nitions which are 
broadly consistent with the approach taken in 
this paper. In particular, the concept of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial development and the related literature 
are further discussed in Section 3 below.
Also, the links between ﬁ  nancial development 
and a range of economic variables have not been 
overlooked in the literature. To our surprise, 
however, there have been no major attempts to 
quantify  ﬁ   nancial development, especially in 
emerging countries. 
A particularly interesting contribution is 
provided by an IMF paper (2006), in which 
the authors measure ﬁ   nancial development in 
mature economies by creating an ad hoc index 
composed of three dimensions: (i) “Traditional 
banking intermediation”, where variables 
such as the volume of funds intermediated 
by banks, banking competition and disclosure 
of  ﬁ   nancial information play a key role; 
(ii) “New ﬁ   nancial intermediation”, which 
addresses non-traditional banking, non-bank 
intermediation and ﬁ   nancial innovation and 
(iii) “ﬁ   nancial markets”, where access to 
ﬁ  nance, liquidity and contract enforcement are 
measured. While this is a comprehensive and 
well-considered project, unfortunately it can 
only cover a restricted group of twelve mature 
economies owing to data constraints.
A more recent work by Creane, Goyal, Mobarak 
and Sab (2007) sets up an index of ﬁ  nancial 
development for a group of Middle East and 
North African countries. The authors collect 
information on six different “facets” of ﬁ  nancial 
development: 1) banking sector size, structure, 
efﬁ  ciency; 2) development of non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
sector; 3) quality of banking regulation and 
supervision; 4) development of the monetary 
sector and monetary policy; 5) ﬁ  nancial sector 
openness and 6) institutional environment. The 
data was collected through a survey with a 
number of questions aimed at answering and 
measuring  ﬁ   nancial sector development. In 
addition, the authors have built a more concise 
index based on four quantitative variables,1 out 
of which they extract the ﬁ  rst  principal 
component to serve as index value. This smaller 
index allows them to compare the evolution of 
ﬁ  nancial development over the last four decades 
for the major developing regions across the 
globe.
There are several other studies analysing 
quantitative aspects of ﬁ  nancial development. 
An interesting example is given by 
Yongfu Huang (2005), who disentangles 
ﬁ   nancial development into four major pillars 
(institutions, policy, geography and other 
variables), measured through 39 variables 
whose signiﬁ   cance is then scrutinised by 
Bayesian model averaging and general-to-
speciﬁ   c methods. However, while this type 
of study is relevant to the evolution of this 
ﬁ  eld of research, it does not quantify ﬁ  nancial 
development in order to make it comparable 
across countries and over time – which is the 
main goal of our paper. 
A relevant quantiﬁ  cation  of  ﬁ  nancial 
development in EMEs is provided in the 
abovementioned WEF report, published in 
September 2008, which was developed in 
parallel with and independently of this paper. 
Compared with the WEF report, our analysis: 
(i) attempts to go beyond the stock-taking of 
latest data, reconstructing time series which 
often date back to 1985; (ii) does not treat 
M2/GDP; assets of deposit money banks/total assets of the  1 
central bank plus deposit money banks; reserve ratio; credit to 
private sector by deposit money banks/GDP.14
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ﬁ  nancial  stability 2 as an integral part of the 
concept of DFD and (iii) delivers similar results 
in terms of the latest assessment of the overall 
degree of DFD in individual countries, as shown 
in Section 4.
The literature on the abovementioned link 
between EMEs’ ﬁ  nancial  underdevelopment, 
international capital ﬂ   ows and external 
imbalances is reviewed in Box 1.
Regarding,  ﬁ   nally, the speciﬁ  c  drivers and 
components of DFD, we understand DFD as 
the capability of one country to channel savings 
into investment efﬁ   ciently and effectively 
within its own borders owing to (i) the quality 
of the institutional and regulatory framework, 
(ii) the size of the ﬁ  nancial markets and private 
agents’ ease of access to them and (iii) the 
ﬁ  nancial markets’ performance, e.g. in terms of 
efﬁ  ciency and liquidity. In Box 2 we summarise 
the literature on each of these three broad 
dimensions, which are the main constituents of 
our index. 
Our index captures the capability of institutions and regulations  2 
to promote ﬁ  nancial development and innovation in order to 
better allocate resources to the investments with highest returns, 
regardless of ﬁ  nancial stability implications. In this way we take 
account of the trade-off between risk and innovation/return by 
only focusing on the latter aspect. This allows us not to rank high 
those EMEs that achieve ﬁ  nancial stability over the short run by 
means of ﬁ  nancial repression, and, on the other hand, to disregard 
ﬁ  nancial stability issues which, as the ongoing crisis stemming 
from the United States conﬁ  rms, are extremely complex.
Box 2
LITERATURE ON THE VARIOUS DIMENSIONS OF DOMESTIC FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Quality of institutions
The role of institutions in ﬁ  nancial development was suggested by law and ﬁ  nance theory. 
This paradigm focuses on the role of institutions in explaining international differences in 
ﬁ  nancial development (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000a, as 
summarises Beck and Levine, 2003). This theory asserts that in countries where legal systems 
enforce private property rights, support private contractual arrangements and protect the legal 
right of investors, savers are more willing to ﬁ  nance ﬁ  rms, and ﬁ  nancial markets prosper. 
In conclusion, the willingness of economic agents to participate in ﬁ  nancial markets and the 
ensuing cross-country differences depend on (i) contract, company, bankruptcy and securities 
laws and the level of credibility and transparency of accounting rules; (ii) the emphasis of legal 
systems on private property rights and (iii) the efﬁ  ciency of contract enforcement. 
Turning to the empirical literature, Levine, Loayza and Beck (1999) investigate the extent to 
which the legal and regulatory environment affects DFD. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) show 
that the national legal origin (e.g. English, French, German or Scandinavian) strongly affects 
the legal and regulatory environment underpinning ﬁ  nancial transactions, thereby explaining 
cross-country differences in DFD. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Levine (1999) show that low 
levels of shareholder rights are associated with poorly developed equity markets. In addition, 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (1999) study the connection between legal institutions and efﬁ  ciency 
of equity markets, focusing on the relationship between legal institutions, the availability and 
precision of information on ﬁ  rms and the efﬁ  ciency of stock prices. They ﬁ  nd that the extent to 
which legal institutions protect private property rights and the rights of minority shareholders 
helps account for cross-country differences in stock market synchronicity. In countries where 15
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legal institutions do not protect shareholders effectively, domestic stock prices largely tend to 
move together, implying lesser information on individual stock prices.
Financial markets’ size and access to ﬁ  nance 
The bulk of the literature on DFD focuses on variables measuring the size of ﬁ  nancial markets, 
taken as proxies for the overall degree of DFD. This approach, however, has evidenced several 
shortcomings since the relationship between size and DFD is often blurred or may present 
non-linearities (see section 3.2.2). Bearing these caveats in mind, however, the size measures do 
have a strong explanatory power when it comes to analysing the level of ﬁ  nancial development 
in a given economy and its implications. Without claiming to be exhaustive, we mention below 
some of the most often quoted papers in the recent literature.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine are among the authors who have delivered the most important 
contributions in this ﬁ  eld of research. Particularly important is a joint work (1999) where they 
develop and interpret a new database on DFD for a large panel of countries, with a time span 
going back to 1960. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) show that a positive relationship exists 
between stock market capitalisation and proﬁ  tability. In a developed equity market environment 
the ﬁ  rms’ funding possibilities are indeed larger and are usually associated with higher returns 
on equity. Chatusripitak and Herring (2000) stress the importance of a liquid bond market 
across the whole spectrum of maturities in order to provide households and ﬁ  rms with risk-
pooling and risk-sharing opportunities. The authors point out that, without market-determined 
interest rates, ﬁ  rms would lack a true measure of the opportunity cost of capital, thereby possibly 
investing less. Rajan and Zingales (2003) look at the “politics” of ﬁ  nancial development in the 
twentieth century. While their main focus is on the inﬂ  uence of “interest groups” in shaping 
patterns and speed of development, their work also provides a good example of how ﬁ  nancial 
development is usually measured. Rajan and Zingales only employ size measures such as equity 
market capitalisation over GDP, the number of listed companies per million of population and 
security issues over GDP. Chinn and Ito have also published several inﬂ  uential papers, with 
their most cited contribution probably concerning the link between DFD and capital account 
openness. In their 2005 paper entitled “What Matters for Financial Development?”, they look at 
the potential impacts of ﬁ  nancial openness on DFD by making use of proxies for DFD mainly 
centred on size variables (e.g. private credit over GDP, stock market capitalisation and stock 
market total value). 
Turning to the literature on access to ﬁ  nance, a good overview is provided in a policy report 
by the World Bank (2008) entitled “Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls”. The authors 
convincingly claim that the literature linking ﬁ   nancial to economic development has 
overemphasised the importance of ﬁ  nancial stability and efﬁ  ciency, and overlooked to a large 
extent the necessity of providing greater access to ﬁ  nance as a means to promote economic and 
social progress.
Financial market performance 
This  ﬁ   rst evidence on the positive effects of ﬁ   nancial markets’ performance on DFD was 
presented by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998). They ﬁ  nd that low overhead costs over 
total asset ratios are typical of mature economies with higher levels of economic and ﬁ  nancial 
development. 16
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Besides traditional size measures, King and Levine (1993a) analyse the role of the public sector 
in ﬁ  nancial markets, measured by the credit allocated by the private sector as a share of credit 
allocated by the central bank. Their conclusion is that private institutions are better at managing 
risk and gathering and managing information on investment opportunities and processes. In 
a subsequent paper, King and Levine (1993b) stress the importance of resource allocation, 
i.e. credit, being concentrated in the private rather than public sector, and suggest a model which 
describes how different ﬁ  nancial systems affect entrepreneurial activity, thereby leading to 
different productivity outcomes. In their words, “…a more-developed ﬁ  nancial system fosters 
productivity improvement by choosing higher quality entrepreneurs and projects, by more 
effectively mobilizing external ﬁ  nancing for these entrepreneurs, by providing superior vehicles 
for diversifying risk of innovative activities, and by revealing more accurately the potentially 
large proﬁ  ts associated with the uncertain business innovation”.17
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3  METHODOLOGY TO CONSTRUCT THE 
COMPOSITE INDEX OF DFD
We measure DFD on the basis of a composite 
normalised index ranging between 0 and 100 and 
based on the three dimensions (institutions, size 
of and access to ﬁ  nancial markets and ﬁ  nancial 
market performance), eight sub-dimensions 
(quality of institutions, etc.), and twenty-two 
variables as summarised in Table 1. We have 
also constructed ad hoc indices for each of the 
individual dimensions and sub-dimensions to 
allow for a more focused analysis of speciﬁ  c 
facets of DFD.
Table 1 Index of domestic financial development: dimensions, sub-dimensions and variables
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Note: Expected effect on DFD in parentheses.18
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We referred to the OECD’s handbook (2005) as 
an assisting tool when deciding upon the order 
of steps to be taken in developing our index, as 
described below in detail.
3.1 GENERAL  CRITERIA 
Deﬁ  ning DFD
“What is badly deﬁ   ned is likely to be badly 
measured” (OECD 2005, page 12) 
Given data constraints, “domestic ﬁ  nancial 
development in EMEs” has in the past been 
measured on the basis of deﬁ  nitions singling out 
speciﬁ  c features of the ﬁ  nancial market, used as 
a proxy for overall ﬁ  nancial development. Two 
examples are:
Chinn and Ito (2005, p. 21): “Financial    •
development – measured as activity of the 
stock market – appears to depend upon 
capital account openness both individually 
and in interaction with the level of legal 
development.”;
Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007,    •
p. 2): “Financial development is characterised 
by the extent to which ﬁ  nancial contracts are 
enforceable”.
Such approaches have a number of advantages, 
but may prove disappointing in terms of 
precision and/or comprehensiveness. We 
therefore suggest the two following 
complementary deﬁ   nitions – one more 
theoretical in nature and the other more suitable 
to orient our empirical analysis – which seem 
more satisfactory given the purposes of this 
paper:  3
Theoretical deﬁ  nition:  A domestic ﬁ  nancial 
market is developed when it consists of 
complete markets where: (i) an equilibrium 
price is determined for every asset in every state 
of the world; (ii) assets are available that protect 
against adverse shocks and (iii) other important 
features supplement completeness, such as 
transparency reducing asymmetric information 
problems, competition and the rule of law. 
Empirical deﬁ  nition: Domestic ﬁ  nancial 
development is the capability of one country 
to channel savings into investment efﬁ  ciently 
and effectively within its own borders owing to 
(i) the quality of its institutional and regulatory 
framework, (ii) the size of its ﬁ  nancial markets, 
the diversity of its ﬁ  nancial  instruments  and 
private agents’ ease of access to them and 
(iii) the ﬁ  nancial markets’ performance, e.g. in 
terms of efﬁ  ciency and liquidity. 
These deﬁ   nitions are broadly consistent with 
Hartmann et al. (2007), who deﬁ  ne  ﬁ  nancial 
development as the process of ﬁ  nancial 
innovation, as well as institutional and 
organisational improvements in a ﬁ  nancial 
system, which reduce asymmetric information, 
increase the completeness of markets, add 
possibilities for agents to engage in ﬁ  nancial 
transactions through (explicit or implicit) 
contracts, reduce transaction costs and increase 
competition.
When constructing the index, we have 
endeavoured to select dimensions and variables 
able to capture and measure the different facets 
of the DFD empirical deﬁ  nition laid out above. 
Country coverage
We have selected the following four groups of 
countries: 
1)  EMEs that are members of the Group of 20 
(called “G20”):
Argentina, Brazil, China, India,    –
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea 
and Turkey. This group is particularly 
interesting on account of its GDP size 
and systemic relevance, the outcome 
of a vigorous process of economic and 
social development in the past few 
decades.
In the literature, the closest deﬁ  nition to the one suggested can be  3 
found in Rajan and Zingales (2003).19
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2)  The group of main commodity exporters not 
already included in the ﬁ  rst group (called 
“commodity” in the graphs):
Bahrain, Chile, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,    –
United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 
This group is of interest given its 
important role as a provider of funding 
and investment to the rest of the world. 
The role of sovereign wealth funds in 
most of these countries, for instance, 
has been a much debated issue recently.
3)  Other key EMEs (called “other EME” in 
the graphs): 
Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, Israel,    –
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan PoC and Thailand. This last 
group is composed of EMEs that do 
not  ﬁ   t into the above groupings, but 
which are nonetheless very important 
for their region and/or have experienced 
remarkable ﬁ  nancial development as in 
the case of Hong Kong SAR, Singapore 
and Taiwan PoC. There are, of course, 
other EMEs which neither lack 
importance nor vigour in their economic 
development, but which had to be 
left out, often just for data availability 
reasons.
4)  The reference group: some benchmark 
mature economies (called “benchmark” in 
the graphs):
United States, Japan, United Kingdom    –
and the euro area, the latter proxied by 
its three G7 member economies 
(Germany, France and Italy, which we 
call euro area-G3  4). These countries 
will serve as the benchmark for 
comparison purposes.
3.2  SELECTING THE VARIABLES
“A composite indicator is above all a sum of its 
parts…” 
The strengths and weaknesses of a composite 
index depend mainly on the quality of the 
underlying variables, which should be selected 
on the basis of their relevance, analytical 
soundness, timeliness and accessibility. 
3.2.1 THE CHOICE OF VARIABLES AND THEIR 
CLASSIFICATION
Our index captures three broad dimensions of 
DFD (see Table 2).
In the following sub-sections we outline the 
variables contained in these dimensions, while a 
detailed description of individual variables and 
the respective academic literature is provided in 
Annex A, which also speciﬁ  es the availability of 
data and their frequency.
Unfortunately, data availability considerations partly affected the  4 
selection of countries, as in most empirical work. In particular, 
we would have liked to incorporate the whole euro area in our 
study as a benchmark, but the lack of data – mainly on the 
institutional variables for the smaller Member States – and the 
changes in the euro area aggregate composition have led us to 
include the three largest economies only.
Table 2 Dimensions of the DFD Index
Domestic Financial Development Index
Institutional dimension Market dimension (1):




– Quality of institutions – Financial innovation
– Technical efficiency
– Liquidity
– Regulatory and judicial
framework
– Residents’ access to 
finance
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3.2.1.1 Institutional  Dimension
Regulatory and judicial framework
Law and order (“contract viability”)    –
Investor protection index   –
Legal rights index   –
Credit information   –
Enforcing contracts   –
Quality of institutions
Corruption   –
Bureaucratic quality   –
Some of the variables mentioned above are broad in 
nature, i.e. they capture phenomena that go beyond 
ﬁ   nancial development per se. We nevertheless 
deemed it useful to include such variables as 
they are not only relevant but, in many respects, 
crucial for the orderly and smooth working of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector. For the sake of clarity, in Annex 
A we denote such broad variables with “B”, and 
those speciﬁ  c variables which strictly pertain to 
the ﬁ  nancial dimension with “S”. 
3.2.1.2   Market Dimension (1): size and access 
to finance
Size – Traditional measures
Stock market value/GDP   –
Private bond market/GDP   –
Total bank claims/GDP   –
Other ﬁ  nancial institutions assets/GDP   –
Residents’ access to ﬁ  nance
Demographic branch penetration   –
Demographic ATM (automated teller    –
machine) penetration
Life insurance penetration   –
Non-life insurance penetration   –
Annual fees for savings account   –
Size – Financial innovation and hedging
Asset and mortgage-backed securities, gross    –
issuance/GDP
3.2.1.3  Market Dimension (2): performance
Technical efﬁ  ciency
Cost/income: Banks’ total operating costs    –
over net interest income
Liquidity
Depth: stock market turnover velocity   –
Distribution of domestic asset base
Central bank claims on private sector/total    –
claims on private sector
Bank claims on public sector/total bank    –
claims
Domestic private debt/domestic government    –
debt
3.2.2  WHY DOES OUR INDEX OF DFD NOT 
INCLUDE CERTAIN VARIABLES TYPICALLY 
CONSIDERED IN THE LITERATURE? 
3.2.2.1 Financial  openness
An important assessment to be made in 
constructing the index concerns the link 
between DFD and ﬁ  nancial openness (FOP)  5 in 
EMEs and other developing countries. Should 
FOP be considered merely as a component of 
the DFD index? In other words, is it necessarily 
true that the more a country is ﬁ  nancially 
integrated the greater its degree of DFD? And, 
more generally, is greater FOP always “good” 
for developing countries, for instance in terms 
of positive impact on growth, regardless of any 
other qualiﬁ  cations? 
Whilst the answer to these questions is not 
straightforward – and indeed one can ﬁ  nd 
different responses in the literature  6 – it is also 
true that empirical evidence on the links between 
FOP and DFD and between FOP and growth is 
ambiguous and not necessarily in line with 
predictions of neoclassical models.
Measured by, e.g. the level, or a change in, foreign assets  5 
and liabilities over GDP. As discussed in Prasad, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2006), a de jure measure of openness (i.e. based 
on a compilation of restrictions on capital ﬂ  ows) cannot measure 
the true extent of ﬁ  nancial integration of a country with the rest 
of the world, whereas an indicator based on capital ﬂ  ows may 
fail to capture the effect on long-term growth. Of course, it 
would be possible to construct a composite index of FOP. This, 
however, falls outside the scope of this paper.
For a review of the literature and a recent update see Kose et al.  6 
(2006), and Rodrik and Subramanian (2008).21
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Regarding the ﬁ  rst link, Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2008; hereinafter RS) argue that lifting 
capital ﬂ  ow restrictions too early in ﬁ  nancially 
underdeveloped economies may undermine 
DFD because (i) governments may be tempted to 
tap a larger pool of funds abroad, hence having 
little incentive to develop domestic markets,7 
and (ii) local private investors would have fewer 
incentives to lobby for reforms at home if they 
are allowed to allocate their savings abroad. 
Concerning the second link, several authors 
have recently argued that opening up to global 
capital may not necessarily be beneﬁ  cial  to 
developing countries. First of all, the empirical 
literature has thus far failed to conﬁ  rm that freer 
capital ﬂ  ows are conducive to speedier economic 
development. Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian 
(2006; henceforth PRS) give evidence of the 
“puzzle” of FOP and growth being positively 
correlated in mature economies, but negatively 
in developing countries. Moreover, RS show 
that in most developing countries a decrease in 
US interest rates relative to domestic interest 
rates does not produce higher domestic 
investment ﬁ  nanced with foreign savings, but – 
surprisingly – the opposite. 
A number of explanations have been put forward 
to explain these puzzles. The most important 
one from our perspective is that opening to 
foreign capital is beneﬁ  cial to the extent that a 
country performs sufﬁ  ciently well in terms of 
property rights, contract enforceability, low 
corruption, absence of expropriation measures, 
etc. (i.e. the type of institutional variable 
captured by our index). Otherwise, RS argue, 
domestic investment demand will tend to be low 
and inelastic to impulses from interest rate 
differentials. In this case, which has been 
labelled as that of an “investment-constrained 
economy”, an increase in FOP owing to ﬁ  nancial 
account liberalisation would only boost 
consumption, with foreign savings simply 
substituting for domestic savings.8 
In the same vein, PRS show that there is a 
negative (positive) correlation between net 
capital  ﬂ   ows (current account balances) and 
growth in developing countries, and argue that 
this may be for two main reasons: (i) low DFD 
restricts the range of investment opportunities 
and private consumption whose ﬁ  nancing  is 
proﬁ   table and (ii) foreign capital absorption 
might lead to exchange rate overvaluation that 
is detrimental to growth.
For all these reasons, our DFD index does not 
incorporate FOP. In other words, in contrast to 
the IMF (2006) – whose abovementioned index 
only deals with mature economies – our index 
on EMEs does not focus on the behaviour of 
individual local agents, i.e. it does not consider 
whether they can gain access to ﬁ  nance in the 
most comprehensive and efﬁ  cient way regardless 
of the origin (domestic or foreign) of fund 
sources. The index therefore does not include 
FOP variables; the approach followed in this 
paper is to single out the importance of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial  markets. This means considering 
the inﬂ   uence of foreign actors only to the 
extent that they are located within emerging 
domestic ﬁ  nancial markets. In terms of market 
completeness, what matters here is whether and 
to what extent emerging markets are relatively 
less complete than mature markets. This may 
also help determine whether emerging markets 
have some bias to produce net capital outﬂ  ows, 
as discussed in Box 1 (review of the relevant 
literature) and Section 7 (econometric analysis).
Such an approach does not mean, however, that 
we neglect FOP but rather that we prefer to use it 
as a separate explanatory variable in our analysis 
(see Section 7). The key issue in the above 
discussion is indeed the speed and sequencing 
of capital ﬂ   ow liberalisation: a gradual and 
well-sequenced process of liberalisation is 
Of course, to the extent that this behaviour would eventually be  7 
conducive to a ﬁ  nancial crisis, it could lead to the subsequent 
development of domestic ﬁ  nancial markets as an indirect second-
round effect.
If, on the contrary, the economy is characterised by plenty of  8 
potentially proﬁ   table investment projects but a part of them 
cannot be ﬁ   nanced at reasonable cost owing to low DFD 
(“savings-constrained economy”), then ﬁ  rms which mainly rely 
on retained earnings would also beneﬁ  t from an increase in FOP. 
In this case, capital inﬂ  ows would also ﬁ  nance an increase in 
domestic investment.22
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expected to be conducive to DFD, make funds 
available more cheaply to poorer countries and 
encourage investment, thus boosting GDP and 
raising living standards. But since it would be 
extremely difﬁ   cult to ascertain a measure of 
the “appropriate degree of liberalisation” of 
capital ﬂ  ows, we prefer to exclude FOP from 
the index and use it separately, since the sign of 
this variable is not predetermined in the case of 
developing countries.
3.2.2.2  Government bond markets
In the literature one can often ﬁ  nd references to 
the importance of a large and liquid government 
bond market (e.g. Herring and Chatusripitak, 
2000). Indeed, a liquid government bond market 
over a large maturity spectrum – especially on 
the long end of the yield curve – is a necessary 
condition for the development of private corporate 
bond markets. At the same time, however, an 
“excessive” level of public debt could also pose 
a risk to the development of private local bond 
markets, owing to (i) the possible crowding-out 
effect of public over private ﬁ  nance and (ii) the 
associated risk of government insolvency that 
could push interest rates up. 
Against these considerations, and bearing in mind 
that our analysis does not focus on the poorest 
developing countries in the early stages of DFD 
but on relatively more developed EMEs, we have 
not included government debt in our DFD size 
indicators since we believe that its effect on DFD 
is highly non-linear. We have instead considered 
government debt in our sub-dimension focusing 
on the distribution of the asset base between the 
private and the public sector. 
3.2.2.3   Banking sector profitability and 
concentration
Another interesting, and still open, debate 
relates to the concentration and proﬁ  tability of 
the banking sector. 
A line of argument is that an oligopolistic banking 
sector could lead to lack of competition, hence to 
monopolistic rents being extracted from savers 
and investors. In some developing countries, 
moreover, a high level of banking concentration 
may be attributable to extensive regulation and 
state-owned banks. In such systems, the lack 
of competitiveness, low technology usage, bad 
information and risk management systems would 
facilitate a situation where overtly inefﬁ  cient 
banks charge high fees in order to maintain their 
bureaucratic apparatus. All these factors would 
negatively affect DFD in a country. 
On the other hand, a number of papers show 
possible positive effects of concentration in 
terms of efﬁ  ciency gains, such as streamlined 
cost structures and synergy gains (see Demsetz 
1973, 1974; Peltzman 1977; Lambson 1987; 
and Berger 1995). In conclusion, both strands 
of the literature on the effects of banking 
concentration give insightful ideas about what 
could be conducive to a better functioning 
ﬁ  nancial industry. Whether to endorse one or 
the opposite argument very much depends on 
the particular market features of a country. As 
a result, the link between banking concentration 
and DFD is ambiguous, a conclusion which led 
us to exclude this variable from our index.
A similar conclusion applies to bank proﬁ  tability. 
High proﬁ   tability could either reﬂ  ect  high 
efﬁ   ciency (thus positively affecting DFD) or 
indicate market power and a lack of efﬁ  ciency 
(which would affect DFD negatively).
3.2.2.4 Financial  derivatives
In the case of exchange-traded derivatives, one 
would expect an increase in DFD to be associated 
with an increase in the volume of derivative 
products used by market participants in order 
to hedge against risk. When DFD increases, 
however,  ﬁ   nancial institutions become more 
able to offer tailor-made solutions to a client’s 
hedging needs. This leads to an upsurge in 
over-the-counter (OTC) products and, possibly, 
even to a decline in exchange-traded derivative 
products, as an analysis of databases such as 
those of the World Federation of Exchanges and 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
seems to conﬁ  rm. Moreover, data on, e.g. stock 
markets may reﬂ  ect episodes of overvaluation, 
therefore calling for some adjustment (as we do 
in this paper).23
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3.2.2.5  Foreign bank penetration
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) ﬁ  nd  a 
positive relationship between foreign bank 
presence and proﬁ  tability,  a  ﬁ  nding  that 
comes as no surprise since one would expect a 
foreign institution to enter a local market only 
where it is likely to achieve higher returns 
compared with local players. The authors also 
conclude that foreign banks serve as a means of 
technology transfer and, as such, are important 
for local market development. Conversely, Cull 
and Peria (2007) draw more mixed conclusions 
when studying the impact of foreign bank 
participation. Since the overall effects of foreign 
bank penetration on DFD – especially in a 
context where countries are confronted with a 
ﬁ  nancial crisis – are still being debated in the 
literature, we have opted to exclude this variable 
from the analysis.
3.3  CONSTRUCTING THE INDEX
3.3.1 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
How to select, group and weigh individual 
variables is a key question. The suitability 
of each variable has to be carefully checked, 
i.e. not only whether it is a good proxy for what 
we want to measure, but also whether it overlaps 
with other variables in terms of explanatory 
power. In the selection process, we also check an 
individual variable’s relative weight compared 
with other variables.
Turning to the grouping of variables, if a full set 
of variables was available to measure one of the 
abovementioned sub-indices, the case could be 
made in favour of applying principal component 
analysis (PCA). In our case, however, we can 
only use a relatively limited amount of variables 
to mirror our three dimensions of DFD. Hence, 
we prefer not to use PCA. In addition, work by 
Djankov, Manraj, McLiesh and Ramalho (2005) 
shows that PCA is likely to lead to results 
similar to other aggregation methods.
3.3.2 NORMALISATION OF DATA 
Make sure you avoid adding apples and 
oranges…
Before data can be aggregated into an index, it is 
necessary to normalise the values of all variables. 
In our case, we have a very heterogeneous set 
of variables ranging from “Law and Order” to 
quantitative indicators of market size, which are 
mutually incompatible if left in their original 
format.
A variety of alternative methods is available for 
normalisation, including ranking; standardisation 
(or z-scores); re-scaling; distance to a reference; 
categorical scale; indicators (above or below 
the mean are assigned -1, 0, or 1); methods for 
cyclical indicators and percentage for cyclical 
indicators. The ﬁ  nal decision on the approach 
to be followed depends mainly on the structure 
of data and the aim of the index (see Ebert and 
Welsh, 2004). 
Given the ﬁ  nal objective of this paper (i.e. to 
shed some light on international capital ﬂ  ows, 
local borrowing constraints and speed of 
convergence with regard to ﬁ  nancial 
development), we consider the re-scaling 
option to be the most appropriate. There are 
three main reasons for choosing this method. 
First, it gives us the opportunity to compare 
our country results with the values of the 
abovementioned index created by the IMF for 
developed economies (see Section 2), although 
this comparison should be made with some 
caution owing to differences in the choice of 
dimensions and variables. Second, in 
comparison with some other normalisation 
procedures, it allows for a more insightful 
analysis of index score developments over 
time. Third, although we could have opted for 
more sophisticated methods such as the PCA 
or an unobserved components model along the 
lines of the “Aggregating Governance 
Indicators” of the World Bank,9 we believe that 
there is value added in keeping the aggregation 
simple and straightforward, thus making it 
easier to pinpoint variables having particularly 
strong impacts on the overall index.
Kaufmann et al. (1999). 9 24
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Re-scaling means normalising each indicator so 
as to achieve an identical range (0; 1). Extreme 
values or outliers, however, could distort the 
transformed indicator. Moreover, re-scaling 
could widen the range of indicators lying within 
a small interval (OECD handbook, 2005).
Our simple re-scaling formula is  




( all xct ) max( all
xct
all
where the variable c  stands for a selected group 
of benchmark countries (i.e. United States, euro 
area-G3, Japan and United Kingdom), and tall 
stands for all time periods. Hence, max  xct ) ( all  
chooses the largest value of variable x over 
all time periods from the pool of benchmark 
countries. 
It should be stressed that we are not looking at 
the maximum value of a speciﬁ  c variable for all 
countries, but only for the mature economies 
we have selected; this is further discussed in 
Section 3.3.3 below. We also decided to use the 
maximum value for each variable over all time 
periods so that we can analyse its development 
across time, in both absolute and relative terms. 
In our transformation we set min(x)=0 value 
because we ﬁ  nd it more intuitive to only look 
at the relative achievements to benchmark 
countries, without implying that an individual 
minimum value directly means a complete 
absence of development in respect to that 
country’s variable.
3.2.3 DEFINITION OF A BENCHMARK
The main problem in deﬁ  ning the benchmark 
is the lack of benchmark values that can be 
obtained from optimality conditions reﬂ  ecting 
the literature. In addition, many of the variables 
might have ambiguous effects especially in the 
case of EMEs. For instance, in the case of stock 
market capitalisation over GDP, it is not clear 
whether “more” means necessarily “better”. 
Indeed there is an increasing volume of literature 
on the development of speculative bubbles 
in EMEs owing to factors such as deﬁ  cient 
institutional setting (see, e.g. Mei, Scheinkman 
and Xiong 2005). Hence, it would be impossible 
to identify a globally optimal level of stock 
market capitalisation over GDP. As a result, it 
seems more plausible to look at the levels of 
market capitalisation within mature benchmark 
economies, where ﬁ  nancial markets have a track 
record spanning a longer period of development, 
as well as relatively lower volatility. 
We therefore choose the highest value achieved 
within our group of benchmark countries as the 
reference maximum value for each variable. 
An alternative approach would have been to pre-
select one country as our benchmark and then 
compute the normalisation using that country’s 
values as the reference max(x). However, a 
complication with this approach stems from 
deep-rooted historical differences in the patterns 
of  ﬁ  nancial sector development. For instance, 
we would need to compare the US market-
based system with the European bank-based 
one, thereby affecting the values of speciﬁ  c 
indicators as a result of the different modes 
of ﬁ  nancial market evolution. For instance, if 
we selected as benchmark a country that has a 
market-based ﬁ  nancial system, we would then 
be rewarding all countries with similar systems 
and penalising the countries with a bank-based 
system. Since the literature is open to debate 
about the relative beneﬁ   ts and drawbacks of 
each system, we prefer not to favour one side 
over the other. Accordingly, we have opted for a 
more pragmatic approach. 
In conclusion, while acknowledging that our 
benchmark values reﬂ   ect different country 
speciﬁ   cities, we believe that allowing for 
changing benchmarks has the advantage of not 
beneﬁ   ting/penalising any particular ﬁ  nancial 
system in a way that might turn out to be 
arbitrary.
3.3.4 DEALING WITH MISSING VARIABLES 
When constructing indices, another major issue 
that arises relates to the problem of missing 
values. A ﬁ  rst question concerns the patterns 
of such missing values, i.e. the degree to which 25
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they are randomly missing or, where there 
are reasons for them being missing, in which 
direction they might be biased. 
In this paper, a lack of data means that 
for certain countries we lack some of the 
indicators that ideally should be in the index. 
This creates problems when aggregating the 
existent variables in order to reach a value for 
our index. 
Let us take the example of a speciﬁ  c  sub-
dimension composed of two variables, for which 
a given country has values for one variable but 
lacks values for the other. When plotting the 
distribution of such variables across all countries 
we could obtain the graphs above, where Case A 
represents the value distribution of one variable 
and Case B represents the value distribution of 
the other variable. 
In cases where the index value for the sub-
dimension is obtained by using simple averages 
of the two variables, then a country for which 
only the variable of Case A is available would 
be performing better than expected, given that 
the probability density function for the other 
variable looks like Case B in our example. 
When building up our database, the lack of data 
was evidenced in two different ways: 
1) Data on a speciﬁ  c variable were available 
but missing at some point in the time series. 
In this case we used the last available data 
point for all following years. 
2) Data were not available for a speciﬁ  c 
variable related to a given country. In this 
case, we decided to correct the lack by 
looking at the other existent variables in 
the same sub-dimension and taking the 
simple average of the rank achieved in 
those index values. We then considered the 
value achieved in the variable of interest 
for a country with the same rank, and used 
that value for the country of interest. Where 
there are no other variables in the same 
sub-dimension, we use the variable that 
seems to be closest to it on economic 
intuition grounds. 
Chart 4 Dealing with missing values of index-components with different distributions


















































Note: The second and third moments of these probability distributions are equal, while the ﬁ  rst moment differs.26
ECB
Occasional Paper No 102
April 2009
Example: We need the value for “fees” in 
Kuwait. 
Step 1  Identifying the other variables in the 
“Access to Finance” sub-dimension, 
to which “fees” belongs. These are: 
“insurance”, “branch”, “atm”, “nonlife”.
Step 2  Taking the average of the achieved 
ranks: 4/26, 11/25, 16/24, 3/26, which 
is 0.344.
Step 3  Looking for the number of countries 
which have values for “fees”: 18.
Step 4  Calculating the comparable rank 
position Kuwait should achieve in 
“fees”: x/18=0.344 <=> x=6.192
Step 5  Rounding “down” and looking for the 
country in “fees” that attains the sixth 
rank, which is Mexico.
Step 6 Using the rank value achieved by 
Mexico in “fees”, which is 0.835, and 
inputing that as the value for Kuwait.
This approach obviously involves only a rough 
method of approximation for missing variables,10 
and we are aware that it may have the effect of 
slightly biasing our results. Keeping that in 
mind, we analysed the individual missing 
variables for each country and assigned a value 
of zero where we believed there was enough 
evidence of biased information. 
3.3.5 WEIGHTING AND AGGREGATION
The weighting scheme chosen also has a 
signiﬁ  cant impact on the composite value of the 
index, and thereby on the ranking of countries. 
There are a number of rating mechanisms 
available, some of which are derived from 
statistical models such as factor analysis, 
data envelopment analysis and unobserved 
component models (UCM). “No matter which 
method is used, weights are essentially value 
judgements. While some analysts might choose 
weights based only on statistical methods, others 
might reward (punish) the components that 
are deemed more (less) inﬂ  uential  depending 
on expert opinion to better reﬂ   ect the policy 
priorities or theoretical factors.” (OECD 
handbook, 2005, page 21.)
The majority of prominent indices (e.g. Human 
Development Index, IMF Financial Index) 
use an “equal weighting” policy. This means 
that every dimension of an index, or even 
all variables which make up the index, are 
assigned equal weighting. While on the one 
hand this could give the impression of a lack 
of understanding of the underlying relationship 
and strengths of causal mechanisms, on the 
other hand we could argue that the dimensions 
of a certain “object of research” are chosen in 
such a way as to be equally important. That 
has indeed been our approach when trying to 
measure DFD. We started with a broader set 
of dimensions and then began aggregating 
variables in order to reduce dimensionality to 
what we believed to be the core and essential 
facets of DFD in emerging economies. Hence, 
we assigned each of the three dimensions of 
our index an equal weight. Within each of the 
three sub-dimensions, individual variables also 
received equal weighting, with the exception of 
the cases highlighted in the text where different 
weighting patterns were required.
For a comprehensive survey on methods for coping with the  10 
missing data problem, see Little and Rubin (2002), and Little and 
Schenker (1994).27
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4   OUR DATABASE 
ON DFD 4  OUR DATABASE ON DFD 
4.1 MAIN  FEATURES
Whilst our database has on the whole a 
rather good coverage, data is partly lacking 
for some countries, especially the smaller 
oil-exporting economies for which several 
statistics are not available (e.g. on debt 
issuance, bank claims, insurance penetration 
and exchange sizes). 
We provide below a simple, broad overview of 
the database in order to check its explanatory 
potential. We focus on some of our 22 variables 
by showing their simple mean within the four 
groups of countries presented in Section 3.1, 
namely the benchmark mature economies, 
G20 countries, non-G20 commodity exporters 
and a residual group of “other EMEs”. 
However, the arithmetic average is not very 
meaningful especially for the latter group, given 
its heterogeneity – with countries ranging from 
Egypt to Hong Kong SAR. 
Starting with the institutional dimension, the 
simple average suggests good information 
content for the ﬁ  rst three groups (Chart 5). In 
particular, the benchmark countries perform 
better than the other country groups as regards 
the different measures of the institutional 
dimension. Clearly, the chart points to a need to 
further break down the group of other EMEs.
Regarding the “traditional” measures of market 
size (Chart 6), most variables unsurprisingly 
present a pattern which is very similar to that 
of the institutional variables. However, market 
capitalisation in the benchmark countries is 
similar to that of commodity exporters, and 
lower than in other EMEs (the last result 
being mainly driven by a very high value for 
Hong Kong SAR). This calls both for an 
explanation and for further efforts to deﬁ  ne the 
proper benchmark. 
Turning to performance indicators, we focus 
on the sub-dimension “distribution of domestic 
asset base”, which, again, presents a pattern 
Chart 5 Individual variables within the 
institutional dimension



















Benchmark Commodity G20 Other EME
law and order (0 to 6)
legal rights index (0 to 6)
investor protection index (0 to 10)
credit information index (0 to 6)
corruption (0 to 6)
Sources: Doing Business from the World Bank and International 
Country Risk Guide produced by PRS Group.
The scale of each component is indicated in parentheses. Except 
for the Investor Protection Index, which has a scale from 0 to 10, 
the variables are scaled from 0 to 6. In all cases, higher numbers 
indicate a higher degree of DFD.
Chart 6 Traditional size measures of 
financial development, as a share of GDP

























other financial instituitions’ assets
Sources: BDL, BIS and International Financial Statistics (IFS).28
ECB
Occasional Paper No 102
April 2009
quite similar to that of institutional indicators 
(Chart 7).
In conclusion, the above evidence suggests 
that two methodological issues remain open to 
discussion. First, it is not always easy to choose 
a benchmark value. Second, there is a problem 
of missing values to be dealt with. We made 
our choices in full awareness of these problems 
(see previous Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4), and 
whilst our results are surely not immune to 
criticism, we believe that they reﬂ  ect the best 
“trade-off” between different considerations. 
4.2  COMPARISON WITH OTHER DATABASES 
OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The bulk of the literature concerning ﬁ  nancial 
development in EMEs has proxied for this 
variable by using only a handful of indicators. 
Among the most common are “stock market 
capitalisation”, “M2/GDP”, “bank claims over 
GDP” and “other ﬁ  nancial institutions’ assets 
over GDP”. Nonetheless, there have also been 
attempts to develop composite indices, thus 
calling for a comparison with our index:
The Financial Development Report 2008: 
World Economic Forum (hereinafter WEF) 
provides the most comprehensive database 
possible, including up to 107 variables organised 
around seven so-called “pillars” of ﬁ  nancial 
systems. WEF, however, focuses on the latest 
data available only, with the aim to revise and 
update the database in years to come. Our paper 
(Dorrucci, Meyer-Cirkel and Santabárbara, 
hereinafter DMS) attempts to reconstruct time 
series, which explains the lower number of 
variables used (22). Moreover, despite the 
different database coverage, the DMS and 
WEF ﬁ  nal indices of DFD deliver rather similar 
results. Out of the 27 economies included in both 
databases, only four (Bahrain, Russia, Turkey 
and United Arab Emirates) present a rank which 
differs by more than ﬁ  ve positions, as the table 
below illustrates: 





United States 1 1
Hong Kong SAR 2 4
United Kingdom 2 (same score as HK) 2
Japan 4 3
Singapore 5 5
South Korea 6 8
Euro area-G3 7 6 (i.e. individual scores for Germany, France and 




South Africa 11 12
China 12 11
Chile 13 17
Chart 7 Variables in the “distribution of 

















domestic private debt over domestic government 
debt 
central bank claims on private sector over total 
claims on private sector
claims on public sector over total bank claims
Benchmark Commodity G20 Other EME
Sources: IFS and BIS.29
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4   OUR DATABASE 
ON DFD
A New Database on Financial Development 
and Structure: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000; hereinafter BDL), was the 
most prominent database of DFD prior to 
WEF (2008). A variety of indicators provided 
insights into the size, activity and efﬁ  ciency 
of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and markets. BDL, 
however, leaves out important information such 
as that on the institutional dimension and access 
to ﬁ  nance, which both DMS and WEF cover.
Finance for All?: World Bank (2008) addresses 
the extent to which individual households in 
developing countries have access to ﬁ  nancial 
services. The database comprises many countries 
and very detailed information, ranging from “loan 
accounts per capita” to “annual fees on savings 
accounts”. As in the case of WEF, however, the 
information is only available for a single year.
Doing Business: The World Bank has an 
ongoing data management project that comprises 
information on business regulations and their 
enforcement in a group of over 170 countries. 
The time span varies, but never goes beyond 
the period 2003-07 for each individual variable. 
This database mainly considers institutional 
performance, quality and transparency.
External Wealth of Nations: Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) present estimates of 
external assets and liabilities for 145 countries 
in the period 1970-2004. This database usefully 
complements those on DFD.






Saudi Arabia 15 14
Turkey 16 22
Thailand 17 16










Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the sources quoted in Annex A; World Economic Forum.30
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5  FINDINGS (1): WHERE DO EMES STAND 
IN TERMS OF DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL 
DIMENSIONS OF DFD, AND HOW MUCH 
PROGRESS HAVE THEY MADE OVER TIME? 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Our results are ﬁ  rst presented for each of the 
three dimensions of our index – institutions, size 
of and access to markets, and market 
performance – and then in terms of the composite 
index, by using two different measures:
a    • broad index that incorporates all our 
22 variables but is only available since 2003. 
This index allows for more thorough cross-
country analysis, which we conduct for 2006 
(and intend to update in the future);
a    • narrow index with a limited set of seven 
variables available since 1985 (also to be 
updated). This second measure permits an 
assessment of how the domestic ﬁ  nancial 
sector evolves in individual countries over 
time, and whether a country is “converging” 
or not.
Although the two indices do not provide the 
same information and their results are not fully 
comparable, their correlation is above 0.98 
for the institutional dimension and 0.91 for 
the dimension “size and access to markets”. 
However, the correlation is only 0.55 for the 
dimension “market performance” – a limitation 
which we take into due consideration in our 
analysis. 
All the results presented in the graphs below show 
the individual index values (ranging between 0 
and 1) for the year 2006, and have been calculated 
by choosing the max value of the benchmark 
countries for the entire period 1985-2006. 
5.1  THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
5.1.1 THE BROAD INSTITUTIONAL INDEX
AND ITS SUB-INDICES
In 2006 the top performers for this dimension 
were three mature economies – United States, 
United Kingdom and Japan – and two Asian 
ﬁ  nancial centres, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. 
Israel, Malaysia and South Korea were the 
other best-ranking emerging economies. On the 
opposite end of the spectrum we ﬁ  nd Venezuela, 
Egypt, Russia and the Philippines. While the 
index ranges between nearly 0.3 (Venezuela) 
and almost 0.9 (United States), about half of the 
sample ranks between 0.5 and 0.7 (Chart 8).
As described above, this index is composed 
of two sub-indices, one for the quality of 
institutions and another for the regulatory 
framework. Regarding the former sub-index, 
Singapore, Israel and Chile are the countries 
ranking in the top positions, whereas Venezuela, 
Russia, China and Thailand present the lowest 
scores. 27% of the sample scores are above 0.6, 
60% between 0.4 and 0.6, and only 13% are 
below 0.4 (Chart 9).
Turning to the sub-index on the regulatory 
framework, most of the sample ranges between 
0.5 and 0.7. Among the emerging economies, 
Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Qatar, Malaysia 
and South Korea present the best regulatory 
Chart 8 The overall institutional dimension 
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5   FINDINGS (1): WHERE 
DO EMES STAND IN 
TERMS OF DIFFERENT 
INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS 
OF DFD, AND HOW 
MUCH PROGRESS HAVE 
THEY MADE OVER TIME? 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
environment, while Venezuela, Egypt and the 
Philippines lack an appropriate framework 
(Chart 10).
Focusing on different emerging market regions, 
our group of benchmark mature economies 
(GDP-weighted score: 0.79) outweighs by far 
any regional group of emerging countries. The 
relatively higher score of emerging Asia (0.58) 
relies on the inclusion of its ﬁ  nancial centres, 
while the residual group of ﬁ  ve countries in the 
EU neighbouring regions (Egypt, Israel, Russia, 
South Africa and Turkey) presents the lowest 
score (Chart 11).
Looking,  ﬁ   nally, at some speciﬁ  c  country 
groupings, it is interesting to observe that the 
score of the three Asian ﬁ  nancial centres (Hong 
Kong SAR, Singapore and Taiwan PoC) is not 
distant (0.72) from that of the benchmark mature 
economies. Conversely, the BRICs (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) still deliver a very low 
GDP-weighted score (0.50) if one considers their 
importance in world output and trade growth. 
This suggests that the still low degree of BRICs’ 
institutional ﬁ  nancial development makes it more 
difﬁ  cult for them to smooth consumption over 
time by borrowing and/or lending. Even lower 
is the score of the group of oil exporters, whose 
underdevelopment in institutional ﬁ  nancial terms 
may contribute to lower ex-post returns than those 
offered by mature economy ﬁ  nancial assets, thus 
creating an incentive to recycle oil revenues by 
investing in such foreign assets. 































Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.
Notes: “Other 5” includes Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Africa and 
Turkey. GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council, comprising 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and 
Kuwait.
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Chart 9 Quality of institutions
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5.1.2  THE NARROW INSTITUTIONAL INDEX
We use the narrow index to assess 
longer-term trends in ﬁ  nancial development and 
the potential process of ﬁ  nancial convergence of 
emerging countries towards benchmark mature 
economies. As explained previously, however, 
the correlation of the narrow with the broad 
measure is high, the two indices are different 
and do not provide exactly the same rank. 
Moreover, owing to lack of data, the narrow 
index for the institutions dimension can be built 
with only three out of the seven variables used 
for the broad index, namely bureaucratic quality 
and degree of corruption (i.e. all variables used 
for the sub-index “Quality of institutions”), 
plus only one of the ﬁ  ve variables used for the 
sub-index “Regulatory and judicial framework”, 
namely “Law and Order”.
Surprisingly, the narrow index reveals that 
in most economies the three abovementioned 
institutional variables displayed a declining trend 
over the last decade, with only a few countries 
able to enhance their institutional framework in 
the period 1996-2006, namely Mexico, Chile, 
Singapore and a few oil exporters (Charts 13 
and 14). Two important caveats should be 
borne in mind, however. First, the three 
abovementioned variables used for the narrow 
Chart 12 Institutional dimension broken 


























Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.
Notes: BRICs means Brazil, Russia, India and China. Russia is 
included twice in the BRICs group and in the group of commodity 
exporters. The Asian ﬁ   nancial centres are Hong Kong SAR, 
Taiwan PoC and Singapore.
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Chart 14 Change in index of institutions 
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index capture the general institutional and 
regulatory environment, but not the ﬁ  nancial 
sector directly, as is instead the case with the 
broad index which includes variables such as 
investor protection and credit information. 
Second,  one cannot rule out that the dataset 
from which our three variables are drawn – the 
“International Country Risk Guide” – does not 
present fully comparable data in its time series. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, we look at the 
changes in the index rank in order to have an 
idea of the catching-up process of EMEs as far 
as the institutional dimension is concerned. To 
this aim, we calculate the difference in each 
country’s ranking between 1996 and 2006. 
Rankings are calculated on an annual basis. 
“1” means in this case that the country is the 
worst performer. Chart 15 shows that Mexico, 
Chile, Singapore and a few oil exporters are 
the countries with better performance not only 
in absolute, but also in relative terms. It would 
seem that a process of institutional catching-up 
has indeed been taking place in these countries. 
On the contrary, Thailand, South Africa, China 
and Brazil appear to have moved, according to 
this index, in the opposite direction.
5.2  THE MARKET SIZE AND ACCESS TO FINANCE 
DIMENSION
5.2.1  THE BROAD INDEX AND ITS SUB-INDICES
We now focus on our second broad dimension 
of DFD. Our index on the size of, and access to, 
ﬁ  nancial  markets 11 shows, not surprisingly, 
three benchmark economies – United States 
(0.79), Japan (0.60) and United Kingdom 
(0.54) – at the top of the ranking for the year 
2006, with the weighted euro area-G3 in ﬁ  fth 
place. The lowest part of the distribution 
presents low variance, ranging between 0.13 
(Indonesia) and 0.23 (United Arab Emirates). 
The intermediate part exhibits instead a far 
steeper pattern, starting with Brazil (0.26) and 
moving up quickly to a value of 0.51 for Taiwan 
PoC. (Chart 16).
As explained in Section 2.2.1, the sub-dimensions of this index  11 
are: 1) the traditional measures of ﬁ  nancial market size (stock 
market capitalisation/GDP, private bond market/GDP, total 
bank claims, other ﬁ   nancial institutions’ assets/total assets); 
2)  ﬁ   nancial innovation, proxied by ABS and MBS issuance; 
3) residents’ access to ﬁ  nance (demographic penetration to bank 
branches and ATMs, life and non-life insurance penetration, and 
annual fees on savings accounts).
Chart 15 Institutional dimension of DFD: 
which countries have caught up between 
1996 and 2006?
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in Annex A.
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Chart 17 below presents the results for the 
sub-dimension we have labelled “traditional 
size measures”, which comprise the stock 
market, the private bond market, and the assets 
of banks and non-banks. These measures are 
“traditional” in the sense that they are the most 
widely quoted in the DFD literature. Besides the 
not surprising results for benchmark economies, 
the highest values are reached by South Africa, 
the three Asian ﬁ   nancial centres, Malaysia 
and South Korea. After Qatar, Chile and 
Thailand – which present intermediate scores – 
the other economies are characterised by 
a gradual decline in values until we reach 
Venezuela’s value of 0.02 only.
Turning to our ﬁ  nancial innovation proxy, given 
by the issuance of asset and mortgage-backed 
securities (ABS and MBS) over GDP, in 2006 
the gap between the United States (0.83) and 
all the other economies was huge, with only the 
United Kingdom also displaying noteworthy 
charts (Chart 18). These data, however, do 
not capture the other components of ﬁ  nancial 
innovation – ﬁ   rst of all the derivatives 
markets – and should be interpreted with 
caution. 2006 is the year preceding the start of 
the still ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis, which, as is 
well known, originated in the ABS and MBS 
markets. In many ways, this variable reﬂ  ects the 
peculiarities of Anglo-Saxon ﬁ  nancial markets, 
where the originate-and-distribute model is 
more developed and particular incentives 
were in place to promote the development of 
mortgage security markets. On the other hand, 
it should be taken into account that our index 
does not aim to capture ﬁ  nancial stability issues, 
but rather phenomena such as the capability of 
one ﬁ  nancial system to allow for consumption 
smoothing – an aspect that our ﬁ  nancial 
innovation variable properly captures. 
Moreover, it should also be stressed that, as 
already discussed in sub-section 3.2.2.4., it is 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex.
Notes: The traditional measures sub-dimension includes the 
following variables: stock market value/GDP, private bond 
market/GDP, total bank claims/GDP, and other ﬁ  nancial 
institutions’ assets/GDP. The ﬁ  nancial innovation sub-dimension 
includes: issuance of asset and mortgage-backed securities 
over GDP. The access to ﬁ   nance sub-dimension includes: 
demographic branch penetration, demographic ATM penetration, 
life insurance penetration, non-life insurance premium and 
annual fees for savings accounts.35
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particularly difﬁ  cult to capture comprehensive 
information on the ﬁ  nancial innovation side for a 
wide group of economies. For instance, selecting 
the volumes of foreign exchange derivatives 
may lead to information distortions since 
ﬂ  oating currencies by deﬁ  nition exhibit higher 
volumes than managed currencies. Similarly, 
choosing inﬂ   ation-linked innovative products 
might lead to overstating DFD in high-inﬂ  ation 
countries as compared with low-inﬂ  ation 
economies. In addition, exchange-traded data 
on derivative markets also present a number of 
ambiguities, as explained previously. All in all, 
and taking each alternative into consideration, 
we concluded that the annual volumes of MBS 
and ABS issuance, provided by the detailed 
Dealogic database, have provided some useful, 
although partial, insight.
Looking, ﬁ  nally, at the “access to ﬁ  nance” sub-
dimension – which summarises the number 
of bank branches and cash machines per 
100,000 people, life and non-life insurance 
penetration, and household expenditure to 
maintain savings accounts – results are led, 
once again, by the United States (0.78), closely 
followed by Taiwan PoC (0.71) and the euro 
area-G3 countries (0.70). A surprising result, 
given their performance in other dimensions, 
is that achieved by Thailand (0.20) and Saudi 
Arabia (0.13), the lowest performers in the 
sample. The group of best performers includes, 
besides some small emerging market ﬁ  nancial 
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Chart 21 Size of and access to financial 





















Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
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centres, South Korea, Israel, South Africa, 
Brazil and, for once, Venezuela (Chart 19).
The geographical breakdown of our index 
illustrates that only the three Asian ﬁ  nancial 
centres reach values comparable to those of the 
benchmark ﬁ  nancial markets, whereas the scope 
for the other country groupings to catch up is 
still very large (Charts 20 and 21).
5.2.2 THE NARROW INDEX OF THE SIZE 
DIMENSION
In order to capture developments over time, we 
now turn to a narrow measure of the size/access 
index, which, as mentioned, is highly correlated 
with the broad measure. This index comprises 
two variables, namely (i) market capitalisation 
over GDP (calculated as a three-year moving 
average in order to smooth out sudden spikes) 
and (ii) non-life insurance penetration. While 
an argument could be made in favour of having 
more variables to measure this dimension, the 
data availability restrictions would make this 
difﬁ  cult. 
Focusing on changes occurring between 1996 
and 2006, we can clearly observe that – unlike 
the institutional and regulatory dimension – major 
progress has been made nearly everywhere, with 
the main exceptions being crisis-hit economies 
such as the Philippines and Malaysia. These 
two countries witnessed abnormally large net 
capital inﬂ  ows in the years preceding the Asian 
crisis, a process which produced stock exchange 
overvaluations. On the other hand, China and two 
GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, made 
remarkable progress in the period considered. 
5.3  THE MARKET PERFORMANCE DIMENSION
Variables such as market liquidity, banking 
efﬁ   ciency and proﬁ   tability, and the relative 
weight of the public sector – both government 
and central bank – in the domestic ﬁ  nancial 
market, all have some explanatory power 
in understanding the degree of ﬁ  nancial 
development of a given country. We seek to 
capture these variables in the third pillar of our 
index – the performance dimension – which is 
probably the most neglected in the literature 
on DFD. Nonetheless, each of the individual 
variables included in this dimension has been 
extensively analysed in the literature, for instance 
in the context of issues related to efﬁ  ciency and 













































Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.
Chart 23 Narrow sub-index of size/access 
dimension: which countries have caught up 
between 1996 and 2006?
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proﬁ  tability. A brief review of main studies in 
this ﬁ  eld is provided in Section 2, Box 2.
Regarding the robustness of our ﬁ  ndings, one 
very important caveat is that we are here entering 
a more uncharted territory than the other 
dimensions. Hence, our conclusions in this 
section are more tentative in nature than those 
drawn in previous sections. In particular, three 
variables included in our database have been 
removed from our index for the reasons 
discussed in Section 3.2.2 and recapitulated 
below.12 As a result, while the performance 
dimension we originally envisaged was based 
on eleven variables, robustness checks and 
analysis of the literature led us to reduce the 
number of variables to eight.
5.3.1 THE BROAD INDEX AND ITS SUB-INDICES
The results for 2006 are partly surprising. Whilst 
the United States remains the best performer 
also under this proﬁ  le, with a score as high as 
0.92, it is followed by South Korea (0.87) and 
strikingly, for the reasons spelled out below, 
China (0.80). The “middle ﬁ  eld” is quite evenly 
spread without much variance, whereas there is 
a faster decrease in index values at the lower end 
of the spectrum, where Indonesia is the lowest 
performer (0.41), followed by Argentina (0.49) 
and the Philippines (0.53). In order to shed some 
light on these results, one needs to look at the 
various, quite heterogeneous, dimensions of the 
index: liquidity, distribution of domestic asset 
base between the private and the ofﬁ  cial sector, 
and banks’ efﬁ  ciency.
The liquidity sub-index focuses on turnover 
velocity in equity markets, measured as the 
ratio between the value of traded shares and 
market capitalisation. This index exhibits a 
large variance of results, with a major drop 
between Bahrain (0.73) and Thailand (0.43), 
followed by a continuous decline in the values. 
Argentina, the worst performing country, scores 
only 0.04. The euro area-G3 countries and 
South Korea lead the group, both achieving an 
index value of 1. China (0.91) also presents a 
very high score. This, however, does not reﬂ  ect 
the absorption capability of the Chinese equity 
market, but rather its extraordinary expansion 
in 2006. Moreover, some emerging economies 
may show a high turnover value simply because 
of the small number of ﬁ  rms traded on the stock 
exchange, which may drive up the amount of 
related trades (Chart 25).
The distribution of the domestic asset base is 
portrayed by three variables:  (i) central bank 
claims on the private sector over total claims 
on the private sector; (ii) the amount of funding 
First 12  , we decided not to include banks’ net interest margins 
in the index, because higher margins do not necessarily 
indicate high performance of ﬁ   nancial markets. Proﬁ  tability 
could be a measure of market power or administrative 
control. In countries such as China, for instance, the 
public authorities still set benchmark ﬂ   oor interest rates on 
banking loans and ceiling interest rates on bank deposits, 
so that banks’ proﬁ   ts are set independently of market rules.
Second, we also decided not to consider the presence of foreign 
banks in the domestic ﬁ   nancial system. We did not think it 
appropriate to penalise those countries where foreign bank 
participation is weak, merely because the literature is rather 
inconclusive about the strength of arguments such as the extent 
to which foreign banks serve as a means of technology transfer.
Third, we realised that “banks’ overhead costs as a share of total 
assets” – a measure of operating costs across banking systems – 
is a variable with information content very similar to the variable 
“total operating costs over net interest income”. In order to avoid 
overlaps and for technical reasons, we used the latter variable for 
the broad index and the ﬁ  rst variable only for the narrow index, 
given its better coverage in terms of time series.
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accruing to the public sector over total bank 
claims and (iii) domestic private debt over 
domestic government debt. This is a particularly 
important sub-dimension, as it captures possible 
“crowding out” effects stemming from the 
public sector. Chart 26 below illustrates that 
the United States is the most economically 
liberal economy (value of 0.97), followed by 
Hong Kong SAR (0.86) and South Korea (0.79). 
At the bottom we ﬁ  nd Indonesia (0.28), Japan 
(0.45), and Turkey (0.55). The relatively good 
ranking of China, eleventh, may reﬂ  ect  that 
Chinese statistics tend not to acknowledge that 
a majority of banks in the country are state run. 
As a result, the Chinese score should again be 
interpreted with a lot of caution. 
Turning,  ﬁ   nally, to the technical efﬁ  ciency 
sub-dimension, the index shows very little 
variance 13 (Chart 27). China’s high ranking 
reﬂ   ects in this case a very good cost/income 
ratio for the banking system which is not only 
attributable to low labour costs but also, more 
importantly, to the setting by the central bank of 
benchmark interest rates on loans and deposits, 
which artiﬁ   cially ensure positive interest rate 
margins to the banking system.
As explained previously, many countries achieve the highest  13 
value because we have taken as the benchmark value the best 
value achieved in our time series within the group of mature 
economies.
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5.3.2 THE NARROW INDEX OF THE PERFORMANCE 
DIMENSION
Using this index – based on overhead costs 
over total assets and domestic private debt over 
domestic government debt – we see that Chile 
(from 0.25 to 0.46) and Hong Kong SAR (from 
0.4 to 0.84) recorded the largest improvements 
in the period 1996-2006. Conversely, Thailand 
and Indonesia recorded a large drop after the 
Asian crisis, and had not yet recovered in 2006, 
with Indonesia moving from 0.54 to 0.23 and 
Thailand from 0.85 to 0.35. 
These results, however, appear to be less robust 
than those discussed in sub-sections 5.2.2 
and 5.1.2 previously, also considering that the 
correlation between the narrow performance 
index and the broad index is only 0.55.
5.4  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEX
Charts 29, 30 and 31 illustrate the positive 
relationship among the three main components 
of the index. Interestingly, this evidence also 
suggests that in 2006 the United States tended to 
be “oversized” in relation to the institutional and 
performance indices, and “over-performing” 
in relation to the institutional and regulatory 
dimension. One may, therefore, provocatively 
wonder whether the expression “ﬁ  nancial 
overdevelopment” could also be introduced. 













































Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
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Chart 29 Relationship between size/access 














































Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted in 
Annex A.
Chart 30 Relationship between size/access 
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Conversely,  ﬁ   nancial systems such as those 
of Chile, Israel and Singapore have relatively 
strong institutions that are not fully reﬂ  ected 
in their size and performance scores. The issue 
why the successful institutional and regulatory 
environments of certain EMEs have not yet 
translated into good-sized and high-performing 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and markets is certainly 
one that deserves further inspection.
Chart 31 Relationship between performance 
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6  FINDINGS (2): THE FINAL COMPOSITE INDEX
6.1  WHERE DO EMES STAND IN TERMS OF 
DOMESTIC FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
COMPARED WITH BENCHMARK MATURE 
ECONOMIES?
After having presented the results for each 
of the three dimensions of our development 
index in Section 4, we can now aggregate such 
dimensions by assigning equal weights, in order 
to obtain our ﬁ  nal composite index as described 
in Table 4 and Chart 32.
All in all, our DFD composite index shows that 
in 2006 the bulk of EMEs still needed to make 
substantial progress to achieve a degree of DFD 
close to the selected G7 benchmark economies. 
The latter presented a (non-weighted) average 
score of approximately 68, whereas the average 
score was below 48 for the emerging market 
group taken as a whole. 
At the same time, the scope for catching up 
varies considerably from country to country. 
The three Asian ﬁ  nancial centres (Hong Kong 
SAR, Singapore and Taiwan PoC) and South 
Korea present total scores comparable with 
those of the G7 benchmark economies. An 
intermediate group of countries, ranging 
between Malaysia and Kuwait, presents scores 
between 0.58 and 0.48. A ﬁ   nal group with 
fourteen countries (54% of our sample) reaches 
low or very low scores, spanning from Saudi 
Table 4 Index of domestic financial development: rankings and scores
(2006)
Composite index of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial development (DFD)
1st dimension: 
institutions and rules 
supporting DFD
2nd dimension: 
ﬁ  nancial market size 
and access to ﬁ  nance 
3rd dimension: selected 
proxies of ﬁ  nancial 
market performance
Country/economy Rank Score
Scale 1 - 100
Rank Rank  Rank 
United States 1 77.3 1 1 1
Hong Kong SAR 2 69.8 3 7 4
United Kingdom 2 69.8 4 3 11
Japan 4 66.2 5 2 22
Singapore 4 66.2 2 9 16
South Korea 6 64.6 8 5 2
Taiwan PoC 7 61.7 12 4 6
Euro area-G3 8 58.6 10 6 5
Malaysia 9 57.9 7 11 8
Bahrain 10 55.4 13 12 7
Israel 11 54.4 6 10 18
Qatar 12 51.8 9 20 17
South Africa 13 49.8 18 8 13
China 14 49.5 21 16 3
Chile 15 48.4 11 13 25
Kuwait 16 48.1 15 17 15
Saudi Arabia 17 45.9 19 26 20
Turkey 18 45.5 16 21 12
Thailand 19 45.0 20 18 9
UAE 20 44.0 26 15 14
Mexico 21 43.2 14 23 21
India 22 42.4 22 19 24
Egypt 23 42.2 29 22 23
Oman 24 41.1 23 28 10
Brazil 25 40.8 24 14 26
Argentina 26 39.6 17 29 29
Philippines 27 36.9 27 24 28
Russia 27 36.9 28 27 19
Indonesia 29 34.1 25 30 30
Venezuela 30 29.4 30 25 27
Source: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted in Annex A.42
ECB
Occasional Paper No 102
April 2009
Arabia (0.46) to Venezuela (0.29). Regarding 
G7 members, in 2006 the United States ranked 
ﬁ  rst under all dimensions of DFD, although the 
ongoing  ﬁ   nancial crisis has of course raised 
serious doubts about certain aspects of its 
ﬁ  nancial model. The euro area-G3 score may 
look relatively poor, but this is largely a result 
of data on Italy which are fully consistent with 
the WEF ﬁ  ndings.14
Whilst thus far we have been focusing on 
individual countries, it is interesting to also 
brieﬂ  y describe the geographical distribution of 
the scores in the composite DFD index across 
different EME groupings. Starting with the 
so-called “BRICs” (Chart 33), on the whole 
they already appear to be “giants” in the global 
economy in terms of, e.g. trade in goods and/or 
services, as well as contribution to world GDP 
growth, but are still “dwarfs” in ﬁ  nancial terms. 
Brazil (25th in the overall ranking) presents 
relatively satisfactory scores in terms of size of 
ﬁ  nancial markets and access to ﬁ  nance, but low 
scores on the institutional side owing to a heavy 
legal and regulatory system. Russia (27th only)
In our index, Italy ranks among the top ten economies in terms  14 
of size and performance, but only 24th in terms of institutions 
underpinning DFD. In the same vein, Italy is placed only 22nd 
in a rank of 52 countries according to the abovementioned WEF 
index (2008).
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Chart 33 Final composite index of DFD: 


























Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.
Notes: Key commodity exporters are Chile, Venezuela, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Russia. The BRICs are Brazil, Russia, India and China. The 
Asian  ﬁ   nancial centres are Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and 
Taiwan PoC.  
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displays an even weaker institutional 
environment, an insufﬁ  cient degree of market 
access and still underdeveloped banks and 
ﬁ   nancial markets, as its high vulnerability 
during the ongoing ﬁ   nancial crisis clearly 
conﬁ   rms. India (22nd) performs relatively 
better as regards its ﬁ   nancial markets and 
non-bank institutions, but requires improvements 
in the business environment, as well as bigger 
and more efﬁ   cient banks. Finally, as already 
discussed in Section 5.3, an unexpected ﬁ  nding 
that calls for further inspection is China’s 
ranking (14th), which should be interpreted with 
a lot of caution. 
Turning to other country groups, emerging Asia 
presents the best total marks, largely because 
of the three abovementioned ﬁ  nancial centres. 
South Korea and Malaysia also rank high, and 
Indonesia and the Philippines are the countries 
with the largest scope for ﬁ  nancial development. 
In Latin America, whilst Chile and Venezuela 
are the best and worst performers respectively, 
the region as a whole appears to be slightly 
less developed than the other regions under 
consideration. The countries participating in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council also present very 
different levels of DFD, stretching between 
Bahrain and Oman. On the whole, further 
progress in domestic ﬁ  nancial development in 
this region would contribute to the domestic 
absorption of its net savings, thus limiting the 
need to re-invest the windfall of oil exports into 
ﬁ  nancial assets of mature economies, thereby 
helping unwind global external imbalances. 
Similar considerations apply to the broader 
group of commodity exporters (Charts 33 
and 34). 
6.2  ARE EMES CATCHING UP IN FINANCIAL 
TERMS TOWARDS BENCHMARK MATURE 
ECONOMIES?
In this section we endeavour to assess longer-
term trends in DFD. The core question is whether 
there are any signs of a process of ﬁ  nancial 
convergence of (some) emerging countries 
towards benchmark mature economies.
To reply to this question, we use the narrow 
index measure based on the size/market access 
dimension, i.e. the one with the best data 
coverage.
Charts 35-37 show interesting results with 
regard to the size dimension:
Chart   •  35 focuses on our G6 benchmark 
economies and illustrates the impact of the 
Japanese crisis in the 1990s and the burst of 
the stock market bubble in 2001;
Chart   •  36 highlights that, in terms of ﬁ  nancial 
markets’ size, EMEs taken as a whole have 
since 2002 begun a process of ﬁ  nancial 
convergence towards mature economies, i.e. 
subsequent to the “dot.com bubble” episode;
Chart   •  37 focuses on selected EMEs and 
shows that: (i) most grew in relative size 
between 1992 and 2006 and (ii) South 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
and India have been noticeably converging 
towards the G6 benchmark in recent years.






















Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.44
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These  ﬁ   ndings complement the stylised facts 
presented in Section 1 (see Charts 1-3 and 
related comment), thus corroborating the view 
that some ﬁ   nancial convergence of EMEs 
towards mature economies has indeed been 
taking place. This process seems to have been 
signiﬁ  cantly  inﬂ  uenced  by  ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
episodes affecting either mature or emerging 
economies. The question, therefore, arises of 
how the picture will look following the ongoing 
ﬁ  nancial crisis.
6.3  A FEW FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
As discussed in Section 3, we had to take a view 
on many issues that arose while constructing 
the index, such as the set of countries to be 
compared, the dimensions and respective 
variables to be used, the data normalisation 
method to be adopted, how to deal with missing 
data, and the choice of aggregation method. 
Every decision was preceded by discussions on 
appropriateness and accompanied by robustness 
checks. 
These types of problem are not unique to our 
project; they are rather an integral part of
most index-building exercises, as can be
inferred from the following statement made in 
the United Nations (UN) World Development 
Report (1992): “No index can be better than 
the data it uses. But this is an argument for 
improving the data, not abandoning the index.” 
While it is not within the scope of this section 
to further elaborate on the different checks 
mentioned in Section 3, below we consider 
Chart 36 Narrow index of size: EMEs 
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y-axis: size sub-index
Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A. 
Chart 37 Narrow index of size: selected 





















Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A. 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.45
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4   FINDINGS (2): 
THE FINAL 
COMPOSITE INDEX
whether our ﬁ   ndings on the composite DFD 
index seem meaningful using some good 
economic intuition. 
The most obvious link that comes to mind 
is the one between ﬁ  nancial  development 
and economic development, most commonly 
measured by per capita income to GDP. A vast 
empirical literature has indeed conﬁ  rmed the link 
between DFD and economic growth. Chart 38 
conﬁ  rms that GDP per capita is higher not only 
in mature economies, but also in those EMEs 
which present the most developed ﬁ  nancial 
systems. Higher levels of DFD also tend to 
be associated with higher levels of ﬁ  nancial 
openness (Chart 37). However, as discussed in 
Section 3.2.2.1 above, this is likely to be true 
for relatively more developed economies such 
as those considered in this paper, whose level of 
DFD has already surpassed a given threshold. 
The role of ﬁ   nancial openness is further 
discussed in the next section. 
Chart 39 Financial openness and financial 
development
(2006)
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Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on the sources quoted 
in Annex A.46
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7  TWO EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 
ON THE RELEVANCE OF EME DFD 
FOR GLOBAL IMBALANCES
According to the recent literature summarised 
in Box 1, the existence of immature ﬁ  nancial 
markets tends to feed private savings and hold 
back domestic demand, since consumers face 
liquidity constraints impeding consumption 
smoothing and part of the investment 
opportunities are not ﬁ   nanced. As a result, 
economies with underdeveloped, and sometimes 
even closed, ﬁ  nancial markets tend to channel 
their excess savings abroad. 
In this section we present two preliminary 
attempts to empirically investigate the role of 
ﬁ   nancial development in explaining global 
imbalances – an issue which has received 
considerable attention in the literature and 
policy debate.
We set up a series of econometric models to test 
whether progressing ﬁ  nancial development and its 
interaction with the degree of ﬁ  nancial openness 
(FO) has been associated with declining current 
account surpluses or increasing current account 
deﬁ  cits. We conduct two exercises:
First, we analyse how changes in DFD    •
inﬂ  uence current account balances, allowing 
for an asymmetric impact of DFD on 
borrowing and lending countries. In this 
exercise we also study the effect of DFD in 
combination with FO to test any potential 
substitution/complementary effect between 
DFD and FO. 
Second, we assess how DFD affects the    •
domestic determinants of the current 
account, i.e. savings and investment. We also 
contrast the effects of ﬁ  nancial development 
on private agents and public institutions 
respectively, which could differ in the 
process of removing liquidity constraints 
and reducing transaction costs. The effects 
of DFD on private as opposed to public 
savings and investment are, therefore, also 
scrutinised.
7.1  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA ISSUES
In our general framework, the current account is 
driven by savings and investment and, therefore, 
the factors that affect both variables are taken 
into account. Following Chinn and Prasad 
(2003) and Chinn and Ito (2008), we estimate 








+ β2 DFD i,t FOi,t
+×
++ ∑ Control variablesi,t





The dependent variables (   • y) are the current 
account balance to GDP, national savings to 
GDP and gross capital formation to GDP. 
In addition, we analyse the determinants of 
public and private savings and investment 
over GDP. 
Our main explanatory variable is DFD,    •
proxied by the “narrow” DFD index 
discussed in Section 3 of this paper. We also 
focus on FO 16 and the interaction between 
DFD and FO. 
As control variables, we introduce the    •
determinants of current account balances, 
savings and investment which are mostly 
used in the literature: government balance 
and net foreign assets to GDP; income per 
capita relative to the United States; output 
growth rates; dependency ratio;17 trade 
openness; dummies for GCC and other 
commodity-exporting countries, as well 
as for the Asian ﬁ  nancial centres; and time 
ﬁ  xed effects.
We have preferred not to use a ﬁ   xed effects speciﬁ  cation,  15 
following Chinn and Prasad (2003). They argued that, if one 
wants to understand cross-country variation in current accounts, 
savings and investment, including ﬁ  xed effects would impair 
most of the economically meaningful parts of the analysis.
Financial openness is here measured with the index provided by  16 
Chinn and Ito (2007), which captures capital controls existing 
in each economy. This index hence does not necessarily capture 
actual  ﬁ   nancial openness as measured, e.g. by the ratio of 
external assets and liabilities over GDP.
Deﬁ   ned as the ratio between dependents and working age  17 
population.47
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The database covers annual data in the period 
1985-2006 for the 26 EMEs and the six 
benchmark G7 members discussed in this paper. 
We transformed annual data into non-overlapping 
three-year averages in order to limit measurement 
errors in the EMEs under scrutiny and to focus 
on the medium-term effects net of more cyclical 
effects. All variables are expressed as ratios.
7.2 METHODOLOGY 
We estimate these models through the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in order 
to tackle potential endogeneity problems. This 
estimator goes beyond the methodology currently 
in use in the empirical literature on savings gluts 
and global imbalances (mainly ordinary least 
squares, ﬁ  xed effects or the instrumental variables 
estimator). The GMM estimator employed uses 
lagged values of the regressors which could 
potentially suffer from endogeneity (considered 
as predetermined variables). The variables treated 
as endogenous and instrumented are shown in 
italics in the result tables below, otherwise they 
are considered as strictly exogenous.18 
All in all, this estimator should yield consistent 
estimations of the parameters. In addition, the 
estimated coefﬁ  cients are the most efﬁ  cient since 
all possible instruments are considered jointly.19 
In order to permit a comparison with similar 
studies, we have conducted robustness tests with 
the ordinary least squares estimator. The results 
are similar suggesting that endogeneity is not 
a relevant issue in this context.20 Estimates are 
available upon request.
7.3  FIRST APPLICATION: HOW DO CHANGES 
IN DFD AND FO AFFECT THE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT OF LENDING AND BORROWING 
COUNTRIES? 
In this application of our DFD index we analyse 
the effect of DFD on the current account of 
lending and borrowing countries, i.e. with 
positive or negative current account balances 
respectively. We study this effect in combination 
with FO, allowing for DFD and FO to either 
substitute or complement one another. In other 
words, if we did not allow for interaction 
between DFD and FO, we would be assuming 
that one country would provide/obtain the same 
amount of external ﬁ  nancing independently of 
the relative level of such variables. 
To conduct this exercise for both lenders (L) 
and borrowers (B) without splitting the sample, 
we modify the equation (2) as follows:
DFD  i,t CAi,t β1 DFD  i,t β  1 ++ = α
LL B
FOi,t
FO  i,t β  2
) (DFDi,t
β  2 +
+
× FOi,t ) (DFDi,t ×

















    
 
(3)
The variables with superscript L (B) take their 
actual value if the country is a lender (borrower), 
otherwise they take the 0 value. Hence, the 
coefﬁ  cients should be interpreted as the actual 
effect of changes in DFD, FO and their interaction 
on the current account to GDP of lending 
(borrowing) countries. We use as a sample our 
26 EMEs and six benchmark G7 countries.
The results are shown in Table 5 and suggest the 
following conclusions:
Growing DFD is very much associated with    •
a reduction of current account surpluses for 
lending countries and a widening of deﬁ  cits 
for borrowing countries.21 In other words, 
We decided to treat all explanatory variables  18  potentially 
correlated with the error term as endogenous. This approach 
led to a signiﬁ  cant number of instruments that might lower the 
power of the Hansen tests for instruments validity. We tried to 
reduce the instruments dimensionality, testing whether some 
of the potentially endogenous variables could be considered 
exogenous through the Hausman test. Unfortunately, in most of 
the cases, the Hausman test could not even be computationally 
implemented because the sample was too small to match the 
asymptotic distribution.
The validity of the selected instruments is tested through the  19 
Hansen test. The large number of instruments in comparison 
to the degrees of freedom might reduce the power of this test. 
We have not employed the Sargan test since it requires an 
assumption of homoskedasticity that seems to be unrealistic in 
a country-based panel.
Such simple models also help explain why a large sample  20 
is needed for the properties of the GMM estimator to hold 
asymptotically.
For borrowing countries, the negative sign indicates a further  21 
decline in the current account balance, namely a growing deﬁ  cit.48
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increasing  DFD within lending countries 
seems to have helped channel savings from 
abroad to their domestic market. In borrowing 
countries, growing DFD also tends to attract 
foreign capital, thus contributing to even 
higher current account deﬁ  cits. 
Higher   •  ﬁ  nancial openness is also signiﬁ  cantly 
related to lower lending by surplus countries 
and higher borrowing by deﬁ  cit countries. 
We also ﬁ   nd some evidence of    •
substitutability between DFD and FO in 
borrowing countries but not in lending 
ones, as shown by the coefﬁ   cient of the 
interaction between FO and DFD, which is 
signiﬁ  cantly positive (i.e. the opposite sign 
to DFD and FO coefﬁ  cients). One possible 
interpretation is that lending countries tend 
to increase their ﬁ  nancing capability in the 
presence of higher DFD or higher FO, but 
jointly these two processes may turn out to 
be counterproductive.
7.4  SECOND APPLICATION: HOW DO CHANGES 
IN DFD AND FO AFFECT THE DETERMINANTS 
OF CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES?
In this second application of the DFD index,
we analyse how DFD and FO affect
the determinants of EMEs’ current account 
imbalances, i.e. savings and investment. In 
addition, we test their effects on private agents 
and public institutions respectively, which 
could differ in the process of removing liquidity 
constraints and reducing transaction costs. 
Table 6 summarises the results 22 and conﬁ  rms 
some of the conclusions that one would have 
drawn from simple stylised facts (i.e. by plotting 
DFD together with our dependent variables): 
Growing DFD is signiﬁ   cantly related to    •
increases in gross capital formation, which 
The results regarding control variables are consistent with  22 
previous literature. We do not highlight such results in this 
section since they are not the main objective of our analysis.
Table 5 Results of the GMM estimation
Current account/GDP
Coefﬁ  cient p-value
Narrow DFD Index (L)  -0.1550*** (0.008)
Narrow DFD Index (B)   -0.2560*** (0.000)
Financial openness (L)   -0.0183* (0.100)
Financial openness (B)   -0.0342*** (0.001)
Narrow DFD*Financial openness (L)  0.0200 (0.464)
Narrow DFD*Financial openness (B)   0.0662*** (0.005)
Net foreign assets/GDP   0.0280 (0.211)
Government balance/GDP  -0.0370 (0.782)
Relative per capita income to US   0.0370 (0.311)
Age dependency ratio    -0.1040** (0.010)
Real GDP growth   -0.0220 (0.797)
Trade openness   0.0358*** (0.000)
Gulf Cooperation Countries    0.3990*** (0.000)
Commodity exporters    0.0257** (0.016)
Asian ﬁ  nancial centres    -0.0360 (0.361)
Constant   0.1340*** (0.001)
Observations  93
Number of countries 23
Hansen test  (1.000)
Robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure with their ﬁ  rst lags.
Time dummies not reported.49
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seems to be mainly driven by private 
investment. This is in line with the idea that 
more developed ﬁ   nancial markets allow 
ﬁ   rms and households to better implement 
their investment decisions. 
DFD has also the expected negative impact    •
on  private savings, but requires to be 
accompanied by ﬁ  nancial openness. 
Financial openness   •  tends to increase private 
savings and total savings signiﬁ  cantly, 
possibly because households and ﬁ  rms tend 
to save more to protect against external 
shocks. However, the positive effect on 
EMEs investment is not signiﬁ  cant.

















Narrow DFD Index  0.023 0.223**  -0.005 0.027  -0.068 0.247*** 
(0.844) (0.048) (0.956) (0.667) (0.219) (0.009) 
Financial openness  0.0433** 0.047  -0.001  0.0443***  0.003  0.037 
(0.045) (0.192) (0.940) (0.005) (0.790) (0.210) 
Narrow DFD*Financial openness  -0.115* -0.088  0.006  -0.121***  0.003  -0.072 
(0.063) (0.365) (0.860) (0.008) (0.905) (0.376) 
Net foreign assets/GDP  0.055 0.013 0.003 0.052 0.110***  -0.027 
(0.328) (0.684) (0.916) (0.194) (0.001) (0.216) 
Government balance/GDP  -0.504* -0.213  0.239  -0.744***  -0.409** 0.251 
(0.058) (0.405) (0.172) (0.005) (0.027) (0.355) 
Relative per capita income to US  -0.141 -0.191**  -0.057 -0.084 -0.254***  -0.010 
(0.102) (0.017) (0.441) (0.448) (0.000) (0.903) 
Age dependency ratio  -0.606***  -0.450***  -0.199**  -0.406**  -0.356***  -0.095 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.026) (0.028) (0.005) (0.312) 
Real GDP growth  0.706*** 0.960*** 0.280**  0.427**  0.140  0.804*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.028) (0.243) (0.001) 
Trade openness  0.0854*** 0.025  0.0630*** 0.022  0.0556** -0.035 
(0.000) (0.368) (0.007) (0.122) (0.029) (0.125) 
Gulf Cooperation Countries  0.461***  -0.006  0.203***  0.258***  0.123*  -0.136 
(0.000) (0.937) (0.004) (0.003) (0.070) (0.192) 
Commodity exporters  0.0716*  0.030  0.0584*  0.013  0.0398**  -0.016 
(0.053) (0.273) (0.077) (0.365) (0.011) (0.321) 
Asian ﬁ  nancial centres  -0.135  -0.067  -0.194*  0.059 
(0.356) (0.603) (0.065) (0.507) 
Constant  0.510*** 0.349*** 0.099  0.411*** 0.280*** 0.114* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.001) (0.001) (0.066) 
Observations 63 63 63 63 52 52
Number of countries  18 18 18 18 14 14
Hansen  test  (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure with their ﬁ  rst lags. 
Time dummies not reported.50
ECB
Occasional Paper No 102
April 2009
8  CONCLUSIONS: SOME OPEN ISSUES FOR 
DISCUSSION AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
In this paper we have constructed, on the basis 
of an original methodology and database, 
composite indices to measure domestic ﬁ  nancial 
development in 26 emerging market economies, 
using mature economies as a benchmark. 
Twenty-two variables have been used and 
grouped according to three broad dimensions. 
With our evidence we have intended to ﬁ  ll a gap 
in the economic literature, which has not thus 
far developed comparable time series including 
both emerging and mature economies. 
Regarding the main ﬁ  ndings, we have presented 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment has been associated 
with capital moving “uphill” from the South 
to the North of the world in recent years. We 
have also seen that, while the scope for EMEs’ 
ﬁ  nancial catching up is still substantial, there 
is some indication that this process has already 
started in some emerging countries. 
Looking forward, one way to interpret such 
ﬁ  ndings is against the background of the current 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and its possible outcomes. 
The ongoing crisis has shown that the ﬁ  nancial 
sector in several economies, notably mature 
economies and the United States in particular, is 
deleveraging and, ultimately, needs to shrink – a 
process which is indeed taking place. At the same 
time, once the negative spillover effects of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis on emerging economies have faded 
away, it is very possible that investors will look 
with renewed interest at their ﬁ  nancial markets. 
As a result, the distance between the 
“benchmark” mature economies and EMEs 
in terms of DFD might narrow further in the 
coming years.
If this scenario were to prove correct, with 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation becoming more 
symmetric in nature, it is possible that the scope 
for any ﬁ  nancially developed country to borrow 
extensively from the rest of the world, and the 
ensuing ability to accumulate massive levels of 
external debt indeﬁ  nitely, would diminish over 
time. Under this scenario, the belief may come 
to an end that it would be optimal for some 
countries to borrow from the rest of the world 
(and for other countries to accumulate claims on 
other countries) indeﬁ  nitely, i.e. under whatever 
circumstances and time horizons. 
Against this background, a number of open 
issues for policy discussion arise:
First, looking backward, would those internal    •
and external imbalances that were a symptom 
of the upcoming ﬁ  nancial crisis have been 
less pronounced in a context of complete 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation? Would have been 
equally feasible for ﬁ  nancially  developed 
economies to considerably weaken, if not 
even break, the link between current income 
and current expenditure, enabling such 
economies to smooth consumption, share 
risk abroad and ﬁ  nance increasingly larger 
current account deﬁ  cits?
Second, looking ahead is it to be expected    •
that, the higher the degree of ﬁ  nancial 
convergence across countries, the greater the 
incentives for policy discipline will be? After 
all, one ultimate lesson of the current crisis 
is that the excesses that characterised the 
so-called “Bretton Woods II” years 
eventually led to a credit crunch and to 
tightening, rather than relaxing, borrowing 
constraints. Such excesses, however, would 
no longer be possible in a context where 
creditors not only worry about the ability 
of debtors to repay their debt, but also have 
credible investment alternatives. 
Third, should further development of    •
domestic and/or regional ﬁ   nance in local 
currency be understood as a strategic 
objective for emerging countries, also 
because such development would make it 
easier for them to run (moderate) current 
account deﬁ   cits without repeating the bad 
experiences of the 1980s and 1990s?51
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Finally, regarding avenues for future research, 
we believe that a more thorough analysis of 
incomplete ﬁ  nancial globalisation as a structural 
factor underlying global imbalances is an issue 
that deserves further examination. Our DFD 
index could be used to this aim. For instance, 
the fact that increasing DFD tends to reduce 
borrowing constraints, as pointed out in this 
paper, should have implications for consumption 
smoothing and consumption volatility that 
deserve ad hoc analysis.52
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ANNEX
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN OUR 
ANALYSIS
Institutional Dimension (See Section 3.2.1.1)
Regulatory and judicial framework
Law and Order (B):    • Assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
as well as its observance. This can be 
interpreted as a contract viability measure. 
The dataset is from the “International Country 
Risk Guide” (ICRG) and encompasses 
the years 1985-2006. Index is published 
monthly. References in the literature are: 
Levine, Loayza and Beck (1999); Chinn and 
Ito (2005).
Investor Protection Index (S):    • This is a 
measure developed in the framework of 
the “Doing Business” assessment by the 
World Bank. It is intended to measure the 
strength of minority shareholders against 
management misuse of corporate assets. 
Publication release at the beginning of the 
year; data collection refers to the previous 
year. References: Djankov and others (2003); 
Beck and Levine (2003); Chinn and Ito 
(2005). The dataset is from the World Bank 
“Doing Business” project and encompasses 
the years 2005-2007.
Legal Rights Index (S):   •  It measures the degree 
to which collateral and bankruptcy laws 
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders, 
thus facilitating lending. Publication release 
at the beginning of the year; data collection 
refers to the previous year. References: Beck 
and Levine (2003); Chinn and Ito (2005). 
The dataset is from the World Bank “Doing 
Business” project and encompasses the years 
2004-2007.
Credit Information (S):    • This index measures 
the degree of information availability, 
through either a public registry or a private 
bureau, so as to facilitate lending decisions. 
Publication release at the beginning of the 
year; data collection refers to the previous 
year. References: Djankov and others 
(2007). The dataset is from the World Bank 
“Doing Business” project and encompasses 
the years 2003-2007. 
Enforcing Contracts (B):    • This index 
measures “the efﬁ   ciency of the judicial 
system in resolving a commercial dispute” 
(quotation from the World Bank “Doing 
Business” project). Publication release at the 
beginning of the year; data collection refers 
to the previous year. References: Djankov 
and others (2003). The dataset is from the 
World Bank “Doing Business” project and 
encompasses the years 2004-2007.
Quality of institutions
Corruption (B):    • This index captures the 
level of corruption within the political 
system. Published monthly. References: 
Gray and Kaufmann (1998). The dataset is 
from the ICRG and encompasses the years 
1985-2006.
Bureaucratic Quality (B):    • It is another broad 
measure of institutional strength and the 
quality of institutions. Published monthly. 
References: Beck and Levine (2003). The 
dataset is from the ICRG and encompasses 
the years 1985-2006.
Market Dimension (1): Size and access to 
ﬁ  nance (See Section 3.2.1.2)
Size - Traditional measures
Stock market value/GDP:    • This measure 
enables assessment of the possibility for local 
ﬁ  rms to access stock markets, thus reducing 
their dependency on traditional banking 
relationships. High values imply enhanced 
households’ investment opportunities, 
since larger stock markets also tend to 
increase ﬁ  rm and risk diversity. References: 
Arestis and Demetriadis (1997); Rajan and 
Zingales (2003); Chinn and Ito (2005). The 53
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dataset is from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine (1999) – hereinafter BDL – and 
encompasses the years 1960-2006. We have 
constructed three-year moving averages in 
order to smooth out sudden spikes. Data are 
deﬂ  ated. Data have been updated relatively 
regularly (every year), with approximately a 
one year lag.
Private bond market/GDP:    • Among other 
things, a higher value implies reduced 
dependency on the banking sector and equity 
markets.23 References: Herring and 
Chatusripitak (2000). The dataset is from 
BDL and Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and encompasses the years 1985-2006. 
Data are deﬂ  ated. Data have been updated 
relatively regularly (every year), with 
approximately a one year lag.
Total bank claims/GDP:    • Total amount of 
banking loans available to economic agents. 
The dataset is from International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) and encompasses the years 
1985-2006. Data is deﬂ  ated. Data updated 
regularly on a yearly basis, with few months 
of lag in publishing.
Other  ﬁ   nancial institutions assets/GDP:    •
This data gives an insight into the diversity 
of  ﬁ   nancial institutions and their relative 
strength. References: BDL (2001); King 
and Levine (1993b). The dataset is from the 
IFS and encompasses the years 1985-2006. 
Data are deﬂ  ated. Data have been updated 
relatively regularly (every year), with 
approximately a one year lag.
Financial innovation
Issuance of Asset and Mortgage-Backed    •
Securities (ABS and MBS) over GDP: 
ABS and MBS issuance is a measure of the 
availability and usage of alternative ﬁ  nancing 
instruments as opposed to traditional 
banking. The dataset is from Bondware and 
encompasses the years 1960-2006. Updated 
frequently (usually monthly), while the 
database (CD) is updated yearly with few 
months of lag in publishing. While it would 
be interesting to include further measures 
of traded derivative products in order to 
capture hedging possibilities for households 
and ﬁ  rms, the data availability is still very 
restrictive for EMEs. 
Residents’ access to ﬁ  nance 
Demographic branch penetration:    • It consists 
in the number of bank branches per 100,000 
inhabitants, and indicates how easy it is for 
a household to borrow money or protect its 
savings. References: World Bank – Finance 
for All (2008). The dataset is from the 
World Bank and encompasses the year 2007. 
Data from World Bank research project. 
Continuity of data update unclear.
Demographic ATM penetration:   •  It provides 
the number of cash machines per 100,000 
inhabitants. This variable gives some further 
insight into how widespread the access is 
to  ﬁ   nancial services and, therefore, into 
the possibility to protect income streams. 
References: World Bank – Finance for All 
(2008). The dataset is from the World Bank 
and encompasses the year 2007. Data from 
World Bank research project. Continuity of 
data update unclear.
Life insurance penetration:    • It consists in the 
life insurance premium volume as a share 
of GDP. Life insurance protects households 
against negative shocks, such as job loss and 
early mortality. The dataset is from BDL/
Swiss Re and encompasses the years 1960-
2006. Reports published regularly by Swiss 
Re (usually once a year), with approximately 
a one year lag.
In the literature we often ﬁ  nd reference to the importance of a  23 
large and liquid government bond market (e.g. Herring and 
Chatusripitak, 2000). We have not included government debt 
here since we believe that its effect is highly non-linear on 
development. In other words, after a certain level of indebtedness 
more debt will be harmful for ﬁ  nancial markets as it signals a loss 
in manoeuvrability of a government’s ﬁ  scal and public policy 
and thereby an increase in the risk of default. Hence, we have 
included a measure for the relationship between government and 
private debt in the performance dimension.54
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Non-life insurance premium:    • It complements 
the previous indicator by reﬂ  ecting  the 
remaining insurance coverage. The dataset 
is from BDL/Swiss Re and encompasses 
the years 1960-2006. Reports published 
regularly by Swiss Re (usually once a year), 
with approximately a one year lag.
Annual fees for savings accounts:    • It is a 
measure of how much income has to be spent 
as a percentage of GDP per capita in order to 
maintain a savings account, and reﬂ  ects the 
affordability for a household to protect its 
income. Important references: World Bank – 
Finance for All (2008). The dataset is from 
the World Bank and encompasses the year 
2007 only. Data from World Bank research 
project. Continuity of data update unclear.
Market Dimension (2): Performance (See 
Section 3.2.1.3)
Technical efﬁ  ciency
Banks’ total operating costs over net    •
interest income: The cost/income ratio, here 
speciﬁ  cally applied to banks, is an expression 
of their total operating costs over net interest 
income. It is therefore commonly interpreted 
as an efﬁ   ciency indicator for the banking 
sector. The dataset is from Bankscope and 
encompasses the years 2000-2006. Updated 
frequently (usually monthly), while the 
database (CD) is updated yearly; less than a 
year lag.
Liquidity
Turnover velocity:   •  It reﬂ   ects the ratio 
of the value of shares traded and market 
capitalisation, and may deliver some 
indication of market absorption capabilities. 
References: Huang (2006); Chinn and 
Ito (2005). The dataset is from the World 
Federation of Exchanges and encompasses 
the years 2006-2007. Yearly report; the 
publication lag can be up to one year.
Distribution of domestic asset base between the 
private and public sector
Central bank claims on private sector/total    •
claims on private sector: It measures central 
bank claims on the real private sector to total 
claims on the real private sector.24This 
variable should give an indication of public 
sector participation in the ﬁ  nancial market. 
Banks and other ﬁ   nancial institutions are 
likely to offer better risk management and 
investment information than the central 
bank. References: BDL (1999), King and 
Levine (1993a); King and Levine (1993b); 
Huang (2006). The dataset is from IFS and 
encompasses the years 1985-2006. Quarterly 
data with lag of one quarter in publishing.
Claims on Public Sector/Total Bank Claims:    •
It measures the amount of funding that is 
channelled to the public sector. We have 
introduced this variable in the database in 
order to capture the crowding out effect on 
the loan market side. The dataset is from the 
IFS and encompasses the years 1985-2006. 
Quarterly data with lag of one quarter in 
publishing.
Domestic private debt/domestic government    •
debt: This variable measures the share of 
bond issues absorbed by government debt. 
We have introduced this variable in the 
database in order to capture the crowding 
out effect on the bond market side. The 
dataset is from BIS and encompasses the 
years 1985-2006. Yearly data with a lag of 
less than one year.
This is obtained as the ratio of (IFS lines 12d) over (sum of IFS  24 
lines 12d, 22d and 42d). Most studies using this type of measure 
add all values of IFS line 12 from a up to d. However, as the 
aim is to capture the extent to which central banks in EMEs 
ﬁ  nance local real private activity (which means that we exclude 
claims to banks and only consider the real sphere), we only use 
the value for line 12d (“Claims on the private sector”). In the 
original ratio the problem is that government bonds on the asset 
side of the central bank balance sheet reduce the effectiveness 
of the results as a lot of these bonds are de facto used in central 
bank liquidity operations.55
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